Speciss College v Maxwell Chiriseri, Emmanuel Chidodo & Allen Musevenzi

The appellant was a college that employed the three respondents as tutors. The respondents participated in a withdrawal of labour on 6 September 2006, at the beginning of a new school term, after their union's strike had been called off. As a result, new students were turned away, tuition fees were not collected, and attending students received no tuition. The respondents were charged with sabotage for their leading role in inciting other employees to participate in the unlawful collective job action. They were dismissed after being found guilty. Thirteen other participants received only final warnings. The respondents appealed successfully to the Local Joint Committee, which set aside their dismissals on the basis that sabotage was not proved. The appellant's subsequent appeals to the National Employment Council and the Labour Court were unsuccessful. The Labour Court found that while the respondents' actions made it difficult or impossible for teaching to be conducted, their withdrawal of labour did not amount to sabotage within the meaning of the Code of Conduct.

• Whether the withdrawal of labour by the respondents amounted to an unlawful collective job action
• Whether the respondents had a right to withdraw their labour in the circumstances
• Whether the respondents' conduct constituted the disciplinary offence of sabotage as defined in the applicable N.E.C.C.S. Employment Code of Conduct
• Whether the Labour Court erred in setting aside the dismissals

The appeal was allowed with costs. The judgment of the Labour Court was set aside and substituted with an order that the appeal (to the Labour Court) be allowed and that the determination of the Disciplinary Committee to dismiss the respondents be upheld. The dismissals of the three respondents were therefore reinstated.

1. A collective job action (strike) is only lawful if it complies with the requirements of section 104 of the Labour Act, including giving 14 days' written notice to the employer and the employment council, and attempting conciliation before resorting to strike action. 2. Employees who participate in an unlawful collective job action have no lawful right to withdraw their labour, as no right can exist to act unlawfully. 3. Sabotage, as defined in the N.E.C.C.S. Employment Code of Conduct, includes the unlawful withdrawal of services by employees where such withdrawal interferes with the normal operations of the employer's business by interrupting services necessary to those operations. It is not limited to interruption of third-party services or physical damage to property. 4. Participation in an unlawful collective job action is itself a dismissible offence under the applicable Code of Conduct, and dismissal is an appropriate sanction, particularly for those who play a leading role in inciting others to participate.

The court criticized the Labour Court for providing "a treatise on the right to strike which was, bearing in mind that the strike was unlawful...totally uncalled for." This suggests judicial disapproval of lengthy academic discussions of rights in contexts where those rights have been exercised unlawfully. The court also noted that consequences of collective job action depend on whether it is lawful or unlawful - while there may be no repercussions from a lawful strike, participants in unlawful strikes face potential civil liability under section 109(6) of the Labour Act for injury, loss, damage or economic loss caused by or arising out of the unlawful action, as well as non-payment of wages for the strike period and potential dismissal.

This case establishes important principles in Zimbabwean labour law regarding the exercise of the right to strike and the consequences of unlawful collective job action. It clarifies that the right to strike is not absolute but must be exercised within strict statutory parameters, including notice requirements and conciliation procedures under section 104 of the Labour Act. The judgment provides authoritative guidance on the definition of 'sabotage' in the employment context, holding that unlawful withdrawal of labour that interrupts services necessary to an employer's operations constitutes sabotage, even where no physical damage to property occurs. The case demonstrates the courts' willingness to impose serious consequences, including dismissal, for employees who participate in unlawful strikes, particularly those in leadership roles who incite others. It reinforces the principle that employees cannot claim the protection of statutory rights when they fail to comply with the statutory obligations that accompany those rights.