The applicant filed an application in the High Court on a certificate of urgency. The genesis of the applicant's problems with the respondent dated back to 2003, continuing through 2007, 2009 and thereafter. The applicant had been fully aware of the respondent's conduct towards him and had the opportunity to take action to clear his name over this extended period. He only rushed to court on an urgent basis on 24 June 2013. The High Court on 26 June 2013 refused to hear the matter as urgent, finding there was no urgency warranting the matter to jump the queue. The applicant then sought leave to appeal from the High Court, which was dismissed. He then applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against the High Court's decision that his matter was not urgent.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. The court noted that the underlying dispute remained pending before the High Court and would take its place in the queue of ordinary court applications to be set down when its turn came.
The binding legal principle is that urgency which stems from deliberate or careless abstention from action until a deadline draws near is not the type of urgency contemplated by the court rules. A matter is urgent only if at the time the need to act arises, the matter cannot wait. Where an applicant has been aware of conduct affecting them for years (in this case from 2003 onwards) and had the opportunity to take action but only rushed to court on an urgent basis in 2013, this does not constitute the urgency required to justify hearing a matter ahead of the ordinary queue. Leave to appeal will not be granted where there are no reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
The court observed that by pursuing the course of action of seeking leave to appeal on the urgency issue, the applicant might possibly have delayed or may delay progress in the finalization of the substantive matter pending before the High Court. This suggests that litigants should carefully consider whether pursuing procedural appeals may be counterproductive to the ultimate resolution of their disputes.
This case reinforces the principles governing urgent applications in Zimbabwean civil procedure, particularly that self-created urgency through delay does not warrant jumping the court queue. It confirms the application of the Kuvarega principle that urgency must exist at the time the need to act arises and the matter cannot wait, not merely because a deadline approaches after prolonged inaction. The case also demonstrates the limited prospects of success in appealing decisions on urgency where an applicant has failed to act timeously over an extended period spanning years.