The applicant was charged in the Magistrates' Court with one count of theft as defined in section 113(2)(d) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act and one count of money laundering in violation of section 8(1)(a) and (d) of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act. She pleaded not guilty. After the State closed its case having called four witnesses, the defence applied for discharge at the close of the state case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The Magistrate dismissed the application, finding that the state had established a prima facie case. The applicant then filed an application for review of the Magistrate's decision and simultaneously sought a stay of the criminal proceedings pending the determination of the review application. The alleged theft occurred between 1 June 2018 and 23 August 2018, involving the applicant's former spouse. The parties divorced on 23 August 2018. A key defence argument was that the prosecution was a nullity because the Prosecutor General had not authorized the prosecution as allegedly required by section 120 of the Criminal Code for spousal theft cases.
The application for stay of proceedings was dismissed with costs.
A superior court will only grant a stay of unterminated criminal proceedings in a lower court pending review in exceptional circumstances where there is proven gross irregularity vitiating the proceedings and giving rise to a miscarriage of justice which cannot be redressed by any other means, or where the interlocutory decision is clearly wrong so as to seriously prejudice the rights of the litigant. A stay of proceedings pending review of a Magistrate's decision dismissing an application for discharge at close of state case depends on the prospects of success of the review application. An application for review should only be entertained where the Magistrate's decision is irrational or untenable, and detailed reasons given by the Magistrate for finding a prima facie case weigh against interference. Applications for discharge at close of state case are not procedures designed to shield an accused who does not intend to be put on his or her defence. Courts will not interfere where the application for review appears to have been filed with a view to frustrate and delay proceedings rather than to address genuine irregularities.
The Court observed that applications for review of Magistrates' decisions dismissing discharge applications are 'flooding' the High Court and are 'all too often' made with the sole intention of delaying or frustrating proceedings in the lower court. The Court commented that the State's concession to the application was not properly made and that the State did not give much thought to the requirements for a stay of proceedings, suggesting that prosecutors should be more careful in making concessions in such applications. The Court noted that it must determine the application without prejudging the applicant's application for review and must merely consider whether it is worth placing before the court for review. The Court commented on the argument regarding section 120 of the Criminal Code, indicating that it was 'a wrong approach' to argue that the court a quo should have concluded that there was no authority to prosecute and that the proceedings were therefore a nullity, though this was not determinative of the main issue before the court.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal procedure law as it reinforces the principles governing applications for stay of proceedings pending review of interlocutory decisions in criminal trials. It confirms the reluctance of superior courts to interfere in unterminated criminal proceedings in lower courts absent exceptional circumstances. The judgment addresses the growing trend of tactical review applications aimed at delaying criminal proceedings, particularly reviews of decisions dismissing discharge applications at close of state case. It clarifies that prospects of success on review must be assessed based on whether the Magistrate's decision was irrational or untenable, not merely on alternative legal arguments. The case also provides guidance on the application of section 120 of the Criminal Code regarding spousal theft prosecutions where the prosecution commences after divorce. The judgment serves as a warning against abuse of review procedures and emphasizes that discharge applications are not mechanisms to avoid giving evidence in one's defence.