The applicant had a dealership agreement with the respondent's predecessor in which it borrowed money to upgrade its service station equipment on the condition it would only sell the respondent's fuel and oil products. Due to erratic supply of products by the respondent, the applicant proposed to purchase the equipment and terminate the agreement. In September 2007, the applicant terminated the dealership agreement and paid the balance of the loan electronically into the respondent's account. The respondent declined to accept the payment and threatened legal action. On 10 November 2007, without prior notice or court order, the respondent visited the applicant's premises and removed six fuel pumps and other associated equipment. The applicant then approached the court on 16 November 2007 on a certificate of urgency seeking a provisional order for the return of the equipment. The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the equipment remained its property under the agreements, that it had the right to remove its equipment at any time, and that the applicant had breached the agreement by allowing third-party products into the tanks.
The provisional order was confirmed. The respondent was restrained from removing specified equipment from the applicant's premises, including one compressor, underground tanks, fuel pumps, canopy, and other accessories. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
In an application for a spoliation order (mandament van spolie), the applicant need only prove two requirements: (1) that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property, and (2) that the respondent deprived him of such possession without consent. The court does not inquire into the juridical nature of the possession claimed or require the applicant to show any reasonable or plausible claim to the property beyond mere possession. The remedy is designed to discourage self-help and breaches of the peace, and possession must be restored regardless of the underlying rights of the parties, which should be determined in separate proceedings. The Zimbabwean courts are bound by the Supreme Court precedent in Botha and Another v Bannet 1996 (2) ZLR 73 (S) in preference to conflicting South African authorities.
The court made obiter observations regarding the South African cases of Parker v Mobil Oil of SA 1979 (4) SA 250 (NC) and Coetzee v Coetzee 1982 (1) SA 933 (C), expressing respectful disagreement with Van den Heever J's view that the spoliation remedy is not absolute and that an applicant must show some reasonable or plausible claim to the property. Makarau JP observed that the weight of authority does not support this proposition and that these South African decisions appear to be inconsistent with the established principles of spoliation. The court also noted obiter that while the respondent's opposition was unsuccessful, it was not unreasonable or frivolous given the confusion in the law that may have been created by Parker's case. The court further observed that the applicant had taken no steps to set the matter down after obtaining the provisional order, with the respondent being the one to enroll the matter.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law for affirming the principles governing the mandament van spolie (spoliation order) and clarifying that courts should not inquire into the juridical nature of possession when determining spoliation applications. The judgment reinforces the principle that the possessory remedy is designed to discourage self-help and breaches of the peace, and that mere proof of peaceful possession and unlawful deprivation is sufficient for relief. The case also demonstrates the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in choosing between conflicting precedents from the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe and South African courts. It serves as an important reminder that even where contractual rights may favor one party, self-help remedies without recourse to law are not permitted.