The Judgment Creditor obtained judgment against The Renewal Energy Hub Incorporated (Pvt) Ltd (the Judgment Debtor) in case number HCHC360/25 on 16 October 2025. On 5 December 2025, the Sheriff attached property to satisfy the judgment debt. Capital Laser Engineering (Private) Limited (the Claimant) laid claim to the attached property, alleging it purchased the assets from Power Speed Electrical Ltd on 8 October 2021. The Claimant was incorporated on 7 October 2021 and concluded a five-year lease with Petronets Investments (Pvt) Ltd for the property at 28 Telford Road, Graniteside, Harare (the address of attachment). The Claimant asserted the Judgment Debtor did not operate at the address of attachment. The Sheriff's return of service from the original case indicated that when attempting to serve the Judgment Debtor, the address was occupied by Capital Laser Engineering and Central Batteries (Pvt) Ltd, not the Judgment Debtor. The Sheriff approached the court through interpleader proceedings in terms of Rule 63. The Judgment Creditor opposed the claim, alleging the Claimant failed to prove ownership, that the agreement of sale was a simulated transaction, and that both the Claimant and Judgment Debtor were controlled by one individual (Rodreck Musiyiwa), suggesting collusion.
A. The Claimant's claim to all property appearing on the Notice of Seizure and Attachment dated 5 December 2025 placed under attachment in execution of the order in HCHC360/25 was granted. B. The property attached in terms of the Notice of Seizure and Attachment dated 5 December 2025 was declared not executable. C. The Judgment Creditor shall pay in full the storage costs incurred by the Applicant from the date of removal of the goods to the date of their release from storage (to the extent applicable). D. The Judgment Creditor shall pay the Claimant's and Applicant's costs on an ordinary scale.
1. The corporate veil may only be pierced in exceptional circumstances where fraud, dishonesty, improper conduct or manifest injustice would otherwise occur. Courts have no general discretion to disregard a company's separate legal personality merely because it might be considered just to do so. 2. Possession of movable property raises a presumption of ownership in favor of the possessor. 3. In interpleader proceedings, a claimant bears the onus to prove ownership on a balance of probabilities. 4. Where a Sheriff's return of service, as an independent officer of the court, indicates that a judgment debtor was not operating at an address and that the claimant was operating there, this constitutes prima facie evidence of possession by the claimant. 5. The presumption of ownership arising from possession can only be rebutted by concrete evidence to the contrary; mere allegations and submissions without supporting evidence are insufficient.
The court observed that the Judgment Creditor ought to have lodged independent investigations into the exact location of the Judgment Debtor and furnished the court with findings of such investigations, rather than relying on speculation and unfounded allegations. The court also commented on the nature of the allegations regarding legal representation (that the same attorney previously represented the Judgment Debtor), noting that such allegations cannot be used to rebut the presumption of ownership arising from possession, particularly where the attorney explained he had left his previous firm and established his own practice. The court emphasized that possession is a critical right which must be protected by the courts in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
This case reinforces fundamental principles in Zimbabwean civil procedure regarding interpleader proceedings and the protection of possessory rights. It affirms the well-established principle from Zandberg v van Zyl that possession of movable property creates a presumption of ownership, which must be rebutted by concrete evidence. The judgment also reiterates the strict conditions under which courts will pierce the corporate veil, requiring exceptional circumstances such as fraud, dishonesty, or manifest injustice, and not merely allegations of common control or representation. The case demonstrates the evidentiary value accorded to a Sheriff's return of service as prima facie evidence from an independent officer of the court. It provides guidance on the standard of proof required to rebut presumptions arising from possession in execution proceedings.