Sanpoulus Maplanka v Oliver Masomera and The Deputy Master

The applicant was one of the sons of the late Fairchild Maplanka, who during his lifetime was married to three wives. Applicant's mother, Evelyn Maplanka (the first wife), passed away on 21 August 2015. In the administration of Fairchild Maplanka's estate (DRB 334/09), an executor Nomsa Hazel Ncube was initially appointed but was relieved of her duties in July 2015. The first respondent was appointed as the new executor on 6 August 2015. The first respondent sought authority from the second respondent (Deputy Master) in terms of section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act to dispose of certain movable and immovable properties belonging to the estate. The applicant became aware of this on 3 November 2015. Meanwhile, Evelyn Maplanka's estate was registered as DRB 898/15, but no executor had yet been appointed. The applicant contended that the proposed sale would prejudice his mother's estate, which had interests in Fairchild Maplanka's estate. Notably, the authority to sell was issued on 16 October 2015, four days before the first respondent applied for it on 20 October 2015.

• Whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for an interim interdict
• Whether the applicant had locus standi to represent his deceased mother's estate without being appointed executor
• Whether the applicant had a prima facie right to protect his deceased mother's interests in his deceased father's estate
• Whether there was a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the sale proceeded
• Whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the interdict
• Whether the authority issued in terms of section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act was properly granted
• Whether the applicant had alternative remedies available

The court granted the provisional interdict with the following orders: (i) The second respondent is interdicted from issuing the first respondent consent to dispose of the assets of the Estate Late Fairchild Maplanka, DRB 334/09; (ii) If such consent had already been issued, the second respondent must revoke it; (iii) The first respondent is interdicted from disposing of the assets of the Estate Late Fairchild Maplanka, DRB 334/09, with or without the consent of the second respondent; (iv) The certificate of authority issued by the second respondent to sell immovable property belonging to the estate is suspended; (v) The provisional order and urgent chamber application shall be served upon the respondents by the applicant's legal practitioners by certificate of service.

An interim interdict will be granted where: (1) the applicant establishes a prima facie right (even if open to doubt); (2) there is a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if relief is not granted; (3) the balance of convenience favours the grant of relief; and (4) there is no other satisfactory remedy. In the context of estate administration, a child of a deceased person has a prima facie right arising from section 21 of the Administration of Estates Act to protect the interests of their deceased parent's estate, particularly where that estate has expectancy interests in another estate and no executor has yet been appointed. An executor's powers under the Administration of Estates Act are not unfettered and must be exercised fairly by consulting all beneficiaries before taking decisions with far-reaching consequences. Authority granted under section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act is defective and improper if issued before the application for such authority has been made. Post-sale remedies under section 52 of the Act are not adequate alternative remedies where irreparable prejudice to an estate will occur.

The court observed that allegations of criminal conduct or improper behavior by the applicant in relation to alleged theft of stock from the estate are not relevant factors in determining whether to grant an interdict to protect estate assets. The court noted with disapproval the practice of issuing authority before receiving the application for such authority, describing it as "improper and illogical." The court suggested that the executor's discretionary powers, while broad, must ultimately be subject to the Master's decision-making authority.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean estate law for establishing the protection of interests of unrepresented estates where a deceased person has an expectancy interest in another estate. It demonstrates the court's willingness to grant interim interdicts to preserve estate assets where procedural irregularities exist and where vulnerable beneficiaries (such as unrepresented estates) may suffer irreparable harm. The case also emphasizes the importance of procedural propriety in the granting of authority under section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act, and that such authority cannot be issued before it is properly applied for. It reinforces that the Master's discretionary powers and the executor's powers are not unfettered and must be exercised fairly with consultation of all beneficiaries.