Three applicants (Safaraz Ahmed Khan, Abdur Razzak Khan, and Muneer Ahmed Khan), who are Botswana nationals and family members, are directors and shareholders of the third respondent company (Bradfix Incorporated (Pvt) Ltd). In 2013, they entered into an agreement with the first respondent (Ragin Kassim) who held five gold claims at Golden Hill Mine Mashava (Blocks 8469, 8470, 8471, 8472, and 8473). A company was registered to undertake the mining business. The applicants invested approximately US$795,000 in the mining project, turning it from a dormant mine into a thriving enterprise. According to the agreement, the first respondent was obliged to transfer all five mining claims to the third respondent company upon commencement of the project, but allegedly deliberately left out Block 8470, where most of the investment was concentrated. The applicants alleged that during the COVID-19 pandemic, while they were in Botswana, the first and second respondents (who are married to each other and also directors/shareholders) took advantage of their absence by employing new security guards who denied applicants access to the mine, failing to provide reports or updates to the board, and not disclosing gold sales to Fidelity Printers. The applicants brought an urgent chamber application seeking to suspend all mining operations at the mine and to authorize deployment of security guards to enforce compliance.
The matter was found not to be urgent and was removed from the roll of urgent matters.
Urgency in the context of urgent chamber applications is not established merely by the seriousness of the matter or the imminent consequences, but requires that the applicant demonstrate they acted when the need to act arose. Urgency stemming from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline draws near is not the type of urgency contemplated by the rules of court. An applicant cannot claim urgency where they have delayed taking action for an extended period (in this case, 6 years regarding the main dispute and 11 months regarding the specific complaints) without reasonable justification. External circumstances such as a pandemic or physical absence from the jurisdiction do not excuse delay where courts remain accessible and alternative means of communication are available for instructing legal practitioners.
The court observed that while there appeared to be controversy and emphasis on Block 8470, that issue might, if necessary, be resolved in another manner (suggesting that the substantive dispute could be pursued through ordinary proceedings). The court also noted that the applicants appeared to have left the first and second respondents to run the mining operations and did not need to be physically in Zimbabwe to know, enquire or pursue the fact that they were not being fully apprised of the mine's operations, implying a criticism of the applicants' approach to managing their investment and corporate governance responsibilities.
This case reinforces the principle that urgency in Zimbabwean civil procedure is determined not merely by the gravity of the matter or the proximity of potential harm, but by whether the applicant acted timeously when the need to act arose. It demonstrates that courts will not entertain urgent applications where applicants have sat on their laurels or delayed action through deliberate or careless abstention. The case also establishes that external circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic or physical absence from the jurisdiction do not automatically excuse delays where alternative means of communication and legal action remain available. This judgment serves as a reminder that the urgent application procedure is reserved for truly urgent matters and should not be used to bypass the ordinary queue where applicants have failed to act promptly.