Rural Electrification Agency v Charles Mashezha

The first respondent was employed by the applicant as a stores clerk on a fixed-term contract for six months, which was extended for twelve months. After this extension, the applicant refused to extend the contract further. A dispute arose and was referred to an arbitrator who ruled in favour of the first respondent on 25 October 2012, ordering the applicant to pay $32,209.34 as damages in lieu of reinstatement, inclusive of back-pay and payment for leave days. The applicant filed an appeal with the Labour Court within the stipulated 21 days and obtained an order on 1 February 2012 (likely 2013) suspending the arbitral award pending appeal. Despite this suspension order, the first respondent filed an application for registration of the award with the High Court under case number HC 6/13. The applicant was served with this application on 3 January 2013 but deliberately chose not to oppose it, reasoning that the court does not deal with the merits of arbitration awards. The award was registered by Kamocha J on 14 February 2013 (stated as 12 February in one paragraph). On 1 February 2013, a writ of execution was obtained and the Deputy Sheriff was instructed to remove the applicant's attached property on 26 February 2013. This prompted the applicant to file an urgent chamber application on 1 March 2013 seeking to suspend the order and stay execution.

• Whether the urgent chamber application was properly constituted as an urgent matter
• Whether the applicant's delay in taking action to oppose the registration of the arbitral award defeated the claim of urgency
• Whether urgency that is self-created through deliberate inaction can justify hearing a matter as urgent

The urgent chamber application was dismissed with costs

Urgency which stems from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline draws near is not the type of urgency contemplated by the rules of court. Where a party is aware of proceedings that may affect their rights and deliberately chooses not to oppose such proceedings despite having the opportunity to do so, they cannot later claim urgency when seeking to set aside or suspend the resulting order. Self-created urgency arising from deliberate failure to act timeously does not justify hearing a matter as an urgent application.

The court made it clear that it was not required to and would not go into the merits and demerits of the appeal against the arbitral award, nor the merits of the matter before the Labour Court and the appeal in that matter, as that was for the Labour Court to decide. The court's primary concern was solely whether the applicant managed to establish that the matter deserved to be heard as an urgent matter. The court also noted that it found it difficult to appreciate the applicant's submission that opposing the registration of the arbitration award was "procedurally impossible" on the basis that the court does not deal with the merits of arbitration awards, characterizing this as a "lame excuse."

This case reinforces the principle that parties cannot create urgency through their own deliberate inaction or failure to take timeous steps to protect their interests. It emphasizes that litigants who are aware of proceedings that may affect their rights must take positive steps to protect those interests, and cannot later claim urgency when they chose not to act when the opportunity arose. The case is particularly relevant in the context of registration and enforcement of arbitral awards, demonstrating that parties with knowledge of such proceedings must actively oppose them if they have grounds to do so, rather than adopting a passive approach and later seeking urgent relief.