The applicants challenged COVID-19 lockdown regulations, specifically SI 174/2020, on three grounds. First, they sought an extension of curfew hours from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., arguing that the 6:00 p.m. starting time was unreasonable given acute transport shortages. Only state-owned ZUPCO buses were permitted to carry passengers, with limited capacity, leaving commuters stranded when the curfew began. The first applicant described an incident on 23 July 2020 where he and other commuters waiting at a bus station were assaulted by police and security forces when curfew began, forcing people to flee or board any available transport. Second, they challenged a press statement issued by Assistant Commissioner Nyathi setting out operational guidelines for police enforcement, arguing it was ultra vires as police lacked legislative powers. Third, they alleged police indiscriminately assaulted members of the public and bundled them into trucks without observing social distancing, contrary to COVID-19 health regulations. By the time of the hearing, SI 200/2020 had been promulgated, extending curfew to 8:00 p.m.
The application was dismissed with no order as to costs, considering the public interest nature of the application.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Courts will not make orders that have been overtaken by subsequent legislation, as such applications become moot; (2) Operational guidelines issued by police to implement lockdown regulations are lawful where they assist the public in discharging their burden of proof under the regulations and do not exceed the scope of the enabling legislation; (3) Courts will not grant generalized orders directing administrative bodies to comply with duties already imposed by law, as this would constitute inappropriate judicial oversight of administrative functions; (4) Courts do not oversee the operations of administrative authorities but rather interpret and enforce law where rights have been violated; (5) Applicants must prove infringement of rights on a balance of probabilities rather than relying on generalized allegations; (6) The placement of the burden of proof on individuals to satisfy enforcement officers that they fall within exemptions to lockdown regulations is reasonable and lawful.
The court observed that the first respondent (Minister of Health) could not justifiably blame another Ministry for transport shortages, as "the government is one" and impact assessments involving relevant Ministries should be jointly carried out when decisions are made in the public interest. The court noted that judicial notice could be taken that many if not all countries worldwide imposed curfews to control COVID-19 spread, and it would be "ridiculous" to allege that a curfew itself was unreasonable given the deadly nature of the virus. The court commented that it would be unreasonable to expect police to maintain exact social distance from persons they are arresting or to expect arrested persons to maintain exact social distances inside police lorries, given the practical realities of law enforcement. The court observed that the COVID-19 pandemic presented an extraordinary situation requiring extraordinary measures.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for clarifying the limits of judicial oversight over administrative actions during public health emergencies. It establishes that courts will not grant generalized declaratory orders directing state organs to comply with duties they already owe under law, as this would constitute inappropriate judicial interference in administrative functions. The judgment recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers, affirming that administrative bodies like the police have their own constitutional structures and powers. It also demonstrates judicial deference to executive decision-making during emergency situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, recognizing that extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary measures and that perfect compliance with all regulations may be impractical during enforcement operations. The case illustrates the principle that relief becomes moot when overtaken by legislative intervention, and that applicants must establish standing and actual infringement rather than seeking abstract declarations.