The applicant sought an urgent chamber application to compel the respondent bank to remove an embargo placed on its account. The applicant's director, Richard Mayiya, claimed that two other directors (a husband and wife team based in South Africa) had resigned, and had communicated this to the bank with instructions to alter the signing mandate. The bank initially complied and Richard made four withdrawals. However, one of the allegedly resigned directors, Reuben Munsamy, subsequently wrote to the bank on the applicant's forged letterhead denying his resignation and warning the bank against honouring withdrawals based on Richard's single signature. The bank then placed an embargo on the account. The applicant's main proof of Reuben's resignation was a resolution dated 24 October 2014, but this referred to Reuben's removal from a different South African entity (RM Mining and Industrial South Africa CC) rather than the Zimbabwean applicant company. The bank had responded to the applicant's legal practitioners on 23 December 2014 explaining the reasons for the embargo and requesting proper documentation confirming Reuben's resignation from the correct entity.
The applicant withdrew the urgent chamber application. The court awarded costs against the applicant on the higher scale.
An urgent chamber application must comply with Form No. 29 as required by the proviso to Rule 241(2), with grounds set out on the face of the application. A certificate of urgency must comply with Rule 244 and contain the basic information and reasons upon which the certifying legal practitioner based their conclusions, not merely arguments on the merits. Legal practitioners must apply their minds independently and support their judgment with proper reasons when certifying urgency. Where an urgent application is fundamentally defective in form and substance, seeks to circumvent a genuine dispute of fact between parties who are not properly joined, and is pursued despite clear warnings and explanations from the opposing party, costs on the higher scale are justified even where the application is withdrawn.
The court observed that it had initially agonized over whether to set the matter down given the numerous defects apparent on the face of the application, but ultimately decided to give the applicant its day in court. The court commended counsel for the applicant (Mr Masango) for the decision to withdraw the application once the defects were pointed out. The court noted that the real dispute was between the directors themselves regarding control of the company, and that the bank's embargo was merely a symptom of this underlying festering dispute. The court did not take issue with the fact that the same legal practitioner who was on record for the applicant had also certified the matter as urgent, despite the respondent's protestation on this point.
This case reinforces the strict procedural requirements for urgent applications in Zimbabwe, particularly compliance with Form No. 29 and Rule 241(2), and the proper content required for certificates of urgency under Rule 244. It demonstrates the court's willingness to award costs on the higher scale against parties who bring defective and vexatious urgent applications. The case also illustrates that urgent applications are not appropriate vehicles for resolving substantive disputes of fact between parties, and that misjoinder and failure to join necessary parties will be fatal to such applications. It emphasizes the duty of legal practitioners certifying urgency to apply their minds independently and provide proper reasons rather than merely arguing the merits.