The applicant became interested in purchasing a property (Stand No. 976 Marlborough Township 14 of Marlborough) registered in the first respondent's name. The property had a mortgage bond (No. 220/15) which the first respondent assured had been paid off, providing a letter of cancellation from his bank. On 22 July 2024, the parties entered into an agreement of sale for USD 180,000.00. The applicant paid the full purchase price through conveyancers Messrs. Maja and Associates, who handed the money to the first respondent with the applicant's consent. The first respondent signed an acknowledgment of receipt. However, the first respondent failed to finalize the cancellation of the mortgage bond and pay the required stamp fees at the Deeds Registry Office, preventing transfer of the property. The applicant sought a mandamus to compel the first respondent to complete the transfer. The first respondent opposed, claiming the parties had actually entered into a loan agreement for USD 27,000.00 at 25% monthly interest, and that the sale documents were merely security for the loan repayment, not an actual sale.
The point in limine was dismissed with costs. While the judgment only explicitly states this preliminary ruling, the dismissal of the point in limine effectively allows the application to proceed and based on the court's reasoning, the mandamus order sought by the applicant would be granted.
A material dispute of fact arises only when material facts alleged by the applicant are disputed and traversed by the respondent in such a manner as to leave the court with no ready answer in the absence of further evidence. A mere allegation of a dispute of fact is not conclusive of its existence. The respondent's defence must set out clear and cogent detail - a bare denial of the applicant's material averments does not suffice. The opposing papers must show a bona fide dispute of fact incapable of resolution without viva voce evidence. A party who admits to signing contractual documents while fully aware of their nature and legal consequences cannot later escape those obligations by claiming a different underlying agreement without presenting compelling evidence to support that alternative version. The principle that he who alleges must prove applies, and courts will decide civil matters on the balance of probabilities.
The court observed that if this had been a case where the first respondent claimed forgery of his signature, the court would have taken a different approach. The court commented that the first respondent appeared to be "trying to escape the inevitable" and noted that as a legal practitioner himself, the first respondent was fully aware of what he was signing and its consequences. The court emphasized that it must consider what would be in the best interest of justice when dealing with such cases, and that it is within the court's discretion to weigh whether deciding a matter without viva voce evidence would prejudice the respondent in such a way that justice would not be served.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean civil procedure law as it clarifies the standard for determining material disputes of fact in application proceedings. It reinforces that mere allegations or bare denials by a respondent are insufficient to create a material dispute of fact - the opposing party must present clear, cogent evidence that raises genuine doubt about the applicant's case. The judgment also emphasizes the principle of sanctity of contract and that parties cannot escape contractual obligations by claiming alternative intentions without supporting evidence, particularly where they have signed written agreements and are legally qualified professionals who should understand the legal consequences of their actions. It affirms that courts will apply the balance of probabilities test and will not require viva voce evidence where documentary evidence overwhelmingly supports one party's version.