Renson Gasela v Constituency Elections Officer for Gweru Rural Constituency and Others

The applicant brought an urgent chamber application to the High Court challenging the nomination of the third respondent in a parliamentary election. The application was dismissed by the High Court as being riddled with procedural flaws and an abuse of court process. The court a quo awarded costs on an attorney and client scale. The reasons for judgment were handed down some time after the judgment. The applicant then sought an extension of time to appeal against the costs order, claiming the delay was due to the late handing down of reasons for judgment. The applicant argued that costs should have been awarded on an ordinary scale rather than attorney and client scale.

• Whether an extension of time to appeal should be granted
• Whether leave to appeal is required before seeking an extension of time for an appeal against a costs order
• Whether the High Court misdirected itself in awarding costs on an attorney and client scale
• Whether Rule 30 subrule 3 or Rule 31 subrule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules applies to applications for extension of time to appeal
• Whether the application complied with section 43(2)(c)(ii) of the High Court Act

The application for extension of time to appeal was dismissed with costs.

An application for extension of time to note an appeal against a costs order cannot succeed where the applicant has not first sought and obtained (or been refused) leave to appeal from the court a quo as required by section 43(2)(c)(ii) of the High Court Act. The failure to seek such leave before approaching the Supreme Court is a fatal irregularity. The Supreme Court can only interfere with a costs order made in the discretion of the court a quo if there has been a misdirection or the order is so unreasonable that no reasonable court could have made it.

The court observed that the matter before the court a quo was handled most ineptly by the applicant's legal practitioners, and that even the application for extension of time was characterized by ineptitude and incompetence. The court noted that it expects clarity when rules are cited, including indication of whether the rule cited is from the High Court or Supreme Court Rules. The court also noted that the correct rule for applications for extension of time to appeal is Rule 31 subrule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, not Rule 30 subrule 3 which does not exist.

This case emphasizes the importance of strict compliance with procedural requirements when seeking to appeal, particularly in relation to costs orders. It clarifies that section 43(2)(c)(ii) of the High Court Act requires leave to be obtained from the High Court before appealing a costs order, and that failure to seek such leave is a fatal irregularity. The case also illustrates the limited scope for appellate interference with a trial court's discretion on costs, and highlights the consequences of incompetent legal practice characterized by procedural errors and failure to cite the correct rules of court.