The applicant (Remnant Christian Church) sought rescission of a default judgment granted on 16 September 2015 under HC 7752/15. The default judgment was an eviction order against Elevate Academy PBC, Innocent Sibanda (Pastor and education/youth director of the Church), and all those claiming occupation through them. The eviction order also included payment of utility bills and holding over damages. The default judgment was granted after the respondent failed to enter appearance to defend, following service of summons on Esline Sibanda (wife of Innocent Sibanda). The applicant had previously lodged a similar application for rescission in HC 9916/15 under Order 9 r 63, involving the same parties, same cause of action, and seeking the same relief. The applicant contended the default judgment was erroneously sought/granted in the absence of a party, or was granted due to fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the return of service. Elevate Academy was operated by the Church but was not registered in terms of the Education Act [Chapter 25:05]. By the time of the rescission application, the applicants had been evicted three years prior.
The application for rescission of judgment was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to bear costs on a legal practitioner-client scale (higher scale) due to abuse of court process.
An application for rescission under Order 49 r 449 requires three elements: (1) judgment was erroneously sought; (2) judgment was erroneously issued; and (3) judgment was granted in the absence of a party affected by it. A properly issued default judgment following proper service and failure to enter appearance to defend does not meet these requirements. Rule 449 is an exception to the functus officio rule and must only be resorted to for correcting an injustice that cannot be corrected in another way. An applicant operating in violation of statutory requirements (such as operating an unregistered school contrary to the Education Act) lacks standing under the 'dirty hands' principle. Courts will not grant relief that has been overtaken by events or that would amount to making contracts for parties.
The court observed that the applicant appeared to have mounted the present application under r 449 to circumvent the time period hurdle and more cumbersome requirements under Order 9 r 63. The court noted that while it has discretion whether to uphold or dismiss a defence of lis alibi pendens, in this case the duplicity of proceedings by the same parties on the same cause of action for the same relief constituted abuse of court process. The court commented that it would not be proper to allow such duplication. The court also noted that in any event, even if the rescission were granted, an order in the main matter would not favor the applicant given the non-payment of rentals and cancelled contract. The court emphasized that it should express its displeasure at abuse of court process by awarding costs on a higher scale.
This case illustrates the strict requirements for rescission of judgment under Order 49 r 449 of the High Court Rules 1971, particularly that the rule is intended to correct injustices that cannot be corrected in another way, not to circumvent procedural requirements. It demonstrates the court's approach to abuse of court process through duplication of proceedings (lis alibi pendens), and the application of the 'dirty hands' principle where a party operates in violation of statutory requirements. The case also reinforces that courts will not make orders that are brutum fulmen (ineffective) or make contracts for parties, and that relief must be competent and not overtaken by events. The punitive costs order demonstrates the court's willingness to express displeasure at abuse of process.