An appeal was set down for hearing on 2 June 2003 against a High Court judgment by Justice Adam in Case No. H.C. 12092/01 concerning citizenship rights under section 9(7) of the Citizenship Act Amendment Act No. 12/2001. On the hearing date, there was no appearance for the appellants (now applicants), despite their averment that the matter was very important. The appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution with costs. The appellants then filed an urgent chamber application for directions on 6 June 2003. The default was explained on the basis that Mrs Matanda-Moyo, the Director of Civil Division handling the matter, had become suddenly ill due to complications from a caesarian section operation. Although a law officer attended court to explain the illness, they arrived after the matter had already been dealt with and dismissed. The applicants argued this created confusion in the law as the High Court judgment was in conflict with a Supreme Court judgment in Registrar-General v Judith Todd SC-158-02.
The chamber application for directions was dismissed with costs. The court noted that it remained entirely open to the applicant to bring a proper application in terms of Rule 36(4) of the Supreme Court Rules for reinstatement of the dismissed appeal.
Where the Supreme Court Rules expressly provide a specific procedure for a particular situation (such as Rule 36(4) providing for reinstatement of appeals dismissed for want of prosecution), a chamber application for general directions is not the appropriate procedural mechanism. The court's function is to adjudicate cases, not to provide legal advice to litigants on what steps to take. A respondent is entitled to know the case they must meet before coming to court, and the court will not convert one type of application into another without proper notice to the respondent, even where the conversion would be substantively justifiable.
The Chief Justice made several non-binding observations: (1) He characterized the respondent's objection to converting the application as 'certainly unreasonable and smacks of an attitude of why should I be difficult when I can be impossible', even while sustaining it on legal grounds; (2) He strongly criticized the handling of the matter by describing it as demonstrating 'crass ineptitude and inefficiency' on the part of the Civil Division of the Attorney-General's office; (3) He noted that Order 23 of the High Court Rules 'was never intended to enable litigants to obtain legal advice from a judge ahead of a hearing'; (4) He acknowledged that it was 'entirely open to the applicant to bring an application in terms of Rule 36(4) of the Supreme Court Rules', suggesting the proper avenue remained available despite dismissing the current application.
This case clarifies the procedural requirements for seeking reinstatement of appeals dismissed for want of prosecution in Zimbabwe's Supreme Court. It emphasizes that litigants and their counsel must familiarize themselves with the applicable court rules rather than seek general directions from the court. The judgment reinforces the principle that respondents are entitled to know the case they must meet before coming to court, which is fundamental to procedural fairness. It also demonstrates the court's intolerance for procedural incompetence, particularly from state law officers. The case serves as a reminder that the Supreme Court Rules provide specific remedies for specific situations, and litigants should utilize the correct procedural mechanism rather than seeking generic relief.