Ray Muzenda and Others v Chiseko Simango and Others

The first applicant claimed to be the President of the second respondent, NASDAC (National Association for Schools Development Associations and Committees), and the second applicant was its Organising Secretary. The first respondent was the Secretary General of NASDAC. A power struggle erupted among NASDAC executive members. On 28 June 2018, the first respondent called a NASDAC meeting where allegations of financial impropriety were levelled against the first and second applicants regarding funds held in a bank account with the third respondent (ABC Bank). Resolutions were passed suspending the first and second applicants as signatories to the NASDAC account and placing a "no debit" caveat on the account to allow auditing. The applicants challenged the legality of that meeting in HC 313/18. Meanwhile, the applicants approached the urgent chamber seeking upliftment of their suspension as signatories and removal of the "no debit" caveat, arguing they needed to access funds to pay third parties including Hartzel High School workers who had won a settlement of $11,047.30. The third applicant's interest was not clearly articulated.

• Whether the matter met the requirements for urgency under Rule 244 of the High Court Rules 1971
• Whether the certificate of urgency complied with Rule 242(2)(b) of the High Court Rules 1971
• Whether the applicants had demonstrated that they would suffer prejudice if the matter proceeded via ordinary procedure
• Whether the applicants had locus standi to bring the application given their suspension from NASDAC

The matter was removed from the roll of urgent matters. The applicants were ordered to pay costs.

For a matter to be heard on an urgent basis under Rule 244 of the High Court Rules 1971, the applicants must: (1) file a proper certificate of urgency complying with Rule 242(2)(b) that discloses basic reasons for urgency; (2) clearly explain what personal interest and prejudice they have that necessitates urgent relief; (3) demonstrate that the relief sought would be rendered nugatory if ordinary procedures were followed; (4) show that they themselves treated the matter as urgent; and (5) have proper locus standi to bring the application. Failure to meet these requirements will result in the matter being removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The court expressed frustration that legal practitioners continue to flout the rules of court regarding certificates of urgency despite numerous cases establishing clear requirements. The judge noted it was unusual for a successful party (the respondents) to request written reasons three months after detailed ex tempore reasons were given, and this delay was never explained. The court attempted to encourage parties to find a solution to ensure ordinary workers and third parties were not prejudiced by the executive dispute, but the parties remained "poles apart."

This case reinforces the strict requirements for urgent chamber applications in Zimbabwean law and emphasizes that legal practitioners must comply with the rules regarding certificates of urgency. It demonstrates the court's willingness to dismiss urgent applications where applicants fail to demonstrate genuine urgency, personal prejudice, or that the relief would be rendered nugatory through ordinary procedures. The case also illustrates that parties cannot use urgent applications to circumvent proper procedures merely because they are involved in ongoing disputes.