On 26 February 2016, Puwayi Chiutsi Legal Practitioners applied for a refund of a taxing fee of USD$4,641.40 that had been deducted by the second respondent (the Taxing Officer) in case number HC7370-11. The taxation was subsequently set aside on review in case number HC9821-14 on 11 November 2014, and the parties thereafter resolved the matter and the bill of costs was withdrawn. On 6 January 2015, the applicant wrote to the respondents seeking a refund of the taxing fee on the basis that the bill had been set aside on review and subsequently settled. The respondents refused to refund the fee. The first respondent filed a report stating that the respondents would abide by the court's decision and sought guidance on the correct legal position. The matter came before the court on the unopposed roll.
The application was dismissed with costs.
A taxing fee prescribed under the High Court (Fees) (Civil Cases) Regulations is payment for services rendered by the taxing officer and is not refundable once those services have been provided, regardless of whether the bill of costs is subsequently set aside on review or withdrawn by agreement. The payment or refund of the fee is not dependent on the success or failure of the litigation. It would be against public policy for monies constituting revenue due to the Fiscus to be subject to the vicissitudes of the outcome of litigation. Any application for a refund of such fees must comply with section 6 of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], which requires 60 days' notice before instituting proceedings against the State or state officials in their official capacity.
The court observed that if it was the intention of the legislature that the fee for the taxing officer's services be refundable, then the regulations as read with the rules of court would have expressly provided for such an eventuality. The court drew an analogy with the prescribed fee for issuing a summons (USD$5.00), noting that a litigant cannot claim a refund of that fee on the basis that the summons was set aside on review, suspended by agreement, or withdrawn, as the fee is payment for services provided. The court also commented that if the order granted on review expressly provided for the refund of the taxing fee, such order should have been attached to the application, and if the parties withdrew the bill of costs by consent, their agreement should have provided for the question of the taxing fee.
This case establishes important principles regarding the refundability of court fees in Zimbabwean law, specifically taxing fees. It clarifies that prescribed fees for services rendered by court officers are payment for services provided and are not ordinarily refundable based on the outcome of litigation. The case also reinforces the importance of compliance with the State Liabilities Act when bringing claims against state officials in their official capacity, emphasizing that proper citation and notice requirements must be met. The judgment protects the Fiscus from having revenue subjected to the uncertainties of litigation outcomes.