The applicant (Zikhali) was conducting business at premises owned by the first respondent (Property Plus Realtors). The first respondent had a lease agreement with a third party (not before the court) who was the lawful tenant. The applicant had a private arrangement with that third party allowing her to occupy the premises as a sub-tenant, but this arrangement was not based on any contractual agreement with the first respondent as the owner. An eviction order had been granted against the third party tenant and all those claiming through her. The Sheriff was proceeding to execute the eviction order, and the applicant sought urgent relief to suspend the execution and ejectment, and to have any attached goods released and delivered to her.
The urgent application was dismissed with costs against the applicant.
A person occupying premises through a private arrangement with a tenant, but without any contractual agreement with the property owner, has no prima facie right to occupy the premises and is considered an unlawful occupier. Such a person falls within the scope of an eviction order granted against the tenant "and all those claiming through her" and cannot successfully apply for an interdict to prevent execution of that order. The first requirement for an interdict - establishment of a prima facie right - is essential, and failure to establish such a right is fatal to an application for interdictory relief.
The court observed that even if, for argument's sake, a right did exist in the applicant's favour, the relief she sought was incompetent as it was final in nature rather than interim, which would be inappropriate for an urgent application seeking temporary relief pending determination of the matter.
This case illustrates the principle in Zimbabwean landlord and tenant law that a sub-tenant or occupier who has no direct contractual relationship with the property owner cannot claim rights against the owner when the primary tenant has been evicted. It reinforces the requirement that applicants seeking interdicts must establish a prima facie right as a threshold requirement, and that those claiming through an evicted party are bound by eviction orders. The case also emphasizes that relief sought in urgent applications must be interim in nature and not final.