The applicant instituted defamation proceedings against the respondents in HC 6788/15 following publication of an allegedly defamatory article in the Daily News newspaper on 5 June 2015. After pleadings closed, parties attended pre-trial conferences on 8 and 9 March 2016 before Musakwa J. On 23 March 2016, parties held a round table conference at the respondents' legal practitioners' offices, attended by the applicant's legal practitioner (Mr Madzingira) and his representative (Mr Ndlovu, a Principal Director in the applicant's office), but not the applicant personally. On 24 March 2016, when the parties appeared before Musakwa J, the applicant was again absent and represented by his legal practitioner and Mr Ndlovu. The respondents then sought dismissal of the claim on the basis that the applicant was in default for not personally attending the pre-trial conference as required by Rule 182(4). The application was granted and the claim was dismissed. The applicant then sought rescission of this order under Rule 449(1)(a) and (b), arguing the judgment was erroneously granted in his absence, filing the application as a chamber application.
The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.
1. A chamber application that fails to comply with Rule 241's mandatory requirement to use Form 29 is not properly before the court and Rule 229C cannot save such non-compliance. 2. Practice Directions are procedural guidelines designed to supplement existing rules but cannot override rules of court which have the force of law. Where a rule of court exists, it takes precedence over a Practice Direction. 3. For rescission under Rule 449(1)(a), three requirements must be satisfied: (i) judgment erroneously sought or granted, (ii) judgment granted in absence of party, and (iii) party's rights affected. A judgment is not 'erroneously granted' where the court was not made aware of relevant circumstances at the time of granting the order. 4. In personal actions, effective representation at pre-trial conferences requires either personal attendance or a proper application to excuse the party with explanation, not mere representation by an office functionary. 5. Where a party chooses one of several available procedures for rescission, the court will not convert the application to proceed under a different rule where no basis has been laid for such alternative procedure.
The court made pointed observations about legal practitioners adopting a "cavalier approach" to procedural compliance, appearing to file pleadings first and read the rules afterwards, then seeking refuge in Rule 4C. Makoni J stated that "a message should be sent to legal practitioners that non-compliance with mandatory rules will be taken seriously by these courts and that Rule 4C will only be used in circumstances where a party brings itself before the court in the form of an application for condonation and good cause shown for the grant of such relief." The court also commented that the applicant's status as Acting President at the time was "neither here nor there" and that he should have made necessary arrangements regarding his personal matters. The judge emphasized that pre-trial conferences are not formalities but essential parts of proceedings where judges set aside time and study pleadings, making it "disrespectful in the extreme" to wait until the scheduled time to advise the court that parties cannot attend.
This case reinforces important principles regarding compliance with procedural rules in Zimbabwean civil litigation. It clarifies the relationship between Practice Directions and Rules of Court, establishing that Practice Directions are supplementary guidelines that cannot override mandatory rules which have the force of law. The judgment emphasizes the strict approach courts take to non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements, particularly regarding the proper form for chamber applications (Rule 241 requiring Form 29). It also reinforces the importance of personal attendance at pre-trial conferences in personal actions and clarifies the scope of Rule 449(1)(a), confirming that a judgment is not 'erroneously granted' where the court was not informed of circumstances that might have affected its decision. The case serves as a warning to legal practitioners about cavalier approaches to procedural compliance and the limits of Rule 4C condonation.