The respondent was a former employee of the appellant company and also served as president of a Trade Union (ZIPAWU). On 22 April 2022, he was suspended without pay and benefits on allegations of misconduct. He was arraigned before a disciplinary committee on 28 April 2022. The disciplinary hearing commenced on 2 June 2022 and proceeded until 14 June 2022. At the close of proceedings on that date, the appellant's case had not concluded. The respondent's legal practitioner sought a postponement to prepare defence and secure witnesses, and advised that the respondent had to attend before a Labour Officer on 15 June 2022. Notwithstanding this application, the disciplinary committee reconvened on 15 June 2022 and proceeded in the respondent's absence, completing the appellant's evidence and directing closing submissions by 17 June 2022. The respondent did not file submissions and was found guilty and dismissed. The respondent applied for review to the Labour Court, which found the proceedings procedurally unfair and ordered the matter remitted for a fresh hearing. The appellant was granted leave to appeal. While the appeal was pending, the appellant complied with the Labour Court's order and instituted fresh disciplinary proceedings, which again resulted in findings favourable to the respondent and became subject to further review proceedings.
1. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent is dismissed. 2. The Registrar is directed to set down the appeal for hearing before the same bench.
1. An appeal is moot only when the dispute becomes academic by reason of changed circumstances such that the court's determination would have no practical effect or yield no effective relief. The decisive consideration is whether the judgment sought would have practical utility. 2. Compliance with a court order, standing alone, does not extinguish a controversy or render an appeal moot if the underlying legal issue remains contested and a determination would still have practical consequences for the parties. 3. Peremption of the right to appeal occurs only when the losing litigant's conduct points indubitably and unequivocally to the conclusion that they do not intend to attack the judgment. The conduct must be inconsistent with any intention to appeal, and the onus of establishing peremption rests on the party alleging it. 4. Compliance with a court order to avoid contempt, while simultaneously pursuing leave to appeal and appellate remedies, is not conduct that points unequivocally to acquiescence in the judgment or abandonment of appeal rights. 5. Court orders must be obeyed unless and until they are set aside, varied by a court of competent jurisdiction, or suspended by the noting of an appeal, and such compliance does not, without more, indicate acquiescence.
The Court noted that the respondent appeared to confuse the doctrines of mootness and peremption during submissions, to the extent that he sought to use Artificial Intelligence during the hearing to acquaint himself with the meaning and scope of mootness. The Court observed that placing litigants in a position where they must choose between compliance with court orders and preservation of their constitutional right of appeal would be untenable. The Court emphasized that it would be inappropriate to find acquiescence in the absence of even a hint of doubt regarding the abandonment of appellate rights. The judgment also noted that respect for the rule of law requires obedience to court orders pending appeal, and this reflects not acquiescence but rather proper legal conduct.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for clarifying the doctrines of mootness and peremption in appellate proceedings. It establishes important principles regarding: (1) when an appeal becomes moot - emphasizing that compliance with an order does not automatically render an appeal academic if the underlying legal issue remains contested and capable of practical effect; (2) the stringent requirements for establishing peremption/acquiescence - requiring unequivocal conduct inconsistent with any intention to appeal, with the onus on the party alleging it; (3) the principle that compliance with court orders pending appeal, undertaken to avoid contempt, does not constitute acquiescence in the judgment; and (4) the protection of constitutional rights of appeal, recognizing that litigants should not be forced to choose between compliance with court orders and preservation of appellate rights. The case reinforces the rule of law principle that court orders must be obeyed until set aside, varied, or suspended, while simultaneously protecting parties' rights to challenge those orders on appeal.