This was an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in the context of a defamation action instituted by the respondent (plaintiff) against the applicant (defendant) under HC 9390-18. The trial had been delayed and had been scheduled to commence on 29 March 2022 but did not proceed. The applicant had raised two intermediary issues: an application to compel further discovery and a technical objection that the respondent's declaration was fatally defective and a nullity. In judgment HH 334-22 delivered on 26 May 2022, Mafusire J disposed of both interlocutory issues in favour of the respondent. The applicant then sought leave to appeal that judgment. The applicant filed her application on 16 June 2022 as a self-actor, but failed to file proof of service. The trial was postponed again on 7 July 2022 due to various logistical problems including the applicant's absence, late briefing of counsel, and the unprocessed leave to appeal application. The applicant sought condonation for not seeking leave to appeal orally immediately after judgment, claiming difficulties in obtaining the full written judgment from the court registries.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs. The trial was directed to proceed on a date, time and place to be advised in due course.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) While points of law can generally be raised at any time during proceedings, exceptions and applications to strike out are subject to Rule 42(3) of the High Court Rules which requires them to be specially pleaded within 10 days of appearance to defend - this is a definitive law that must be complied with and condonation must be sought for non-compliance; (2) In defamation actions, a plaintiff is not required to plead the exact words (ipsissima verba) complained of, but may plead the substance and effect of the defamatory words (following Munyai v Chikasha 1992 (2) ZLR 31 (S) and Chimakure v Mutambara SC 91-20); (3) A bare denial in pleadings constitutes no plea and cannot negate substantive admissions made elsewhere in the pleadings or in sworn statements; (4) Leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments requires consideration of prospects of success, balance of convenience, importance to parties, and whether novel legal issues arise - the court will refuse leave where the application appears to be a stratagem to delay proceedings rather than raise genuine legal issues; (5) Where a defendant pleads justification or truth in a defamation action, the onus of proving that defence rests on the defendant.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) It flagged but did not decide whether Rule 58(14) and (15) regarding proof of service requirements apply to applications for leave to appeal under Rule 94, noting this would benefit from fuller argument; (2) The court expressed concern about the delays and procedural inefficiencies during the transitional period following establishment of the Commercial Court, including difficulties in locating records between the general division registry and the digital Commercial Court registry; (3) The court observed that allowing appeals 'at every drop of a hat' does not bode well for the administration of justice, and that piecemeal interlocutory appeals can be wasteful compared to completing trial and allowing comprehensive appeal thereafter; (4) The court remarked on what it characterized as a thinly veiled demand for recusal couched in polite legalese, commenting that a philosophy suggesting justice is only justice if decided in a particular way is 'wicked and self-serving' (citing Chimhini v Chairperson, ZEC); (5) The court noted the applicant's conduct in filing a 43-page document as a strategy of 'spraying and dispersing' points of law across multiple paragraphs to obscure their true nature.
This case is significant for clarifying the proper application of High Court Rules regarding leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments in Zimbabwe. It emphasizes that: (1) while points of law can generally be raised at any stage, exceptions and applications to strike out are governed by definitive procedural rules requiring compliance with time limits and special pleading requirements; (2) condonation must be sought where such time limits are exceeded; (3) in defamation actions, it is sufficient to plead the substance and effect of defamatory words rather than the ipsissima verba; (4) a bare denial is no plea and substantive admissions in pleadings cannot be negated by formulaic denials; (5) leave to appeal interlocutory matters requires careful scrutiny to prevent abuse of process and delay tactics; and (6) the balance of convenience in interlocutory appeals must weigh allowing piecemeal appeals against expeditious completion of trials. The judgment demonstrates robust case management and refusal to countenance procedural abuse designed to frustrate the course of justice.