The applicants owned two farms: Swaart Spruit and the remaining extent of Mosenthal's farm. There was an earlier undertaking or agreement between the applicants and respondents regarding these properties, the history of which was documented in the Administrative Court. Despite this undertaking/agreement, on 24 December 2001, the second respondent (Minister of Lands) made Acquisition of Land Orders under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10] in respect of both farms, acting on the authority of the first respondent (President). The orders were served on the applicants on 4 January 2002. The applicants alleged that the issuance of these acquisition orders was unlawful as it breached the earlier agreement, and the respondents had not established grounds to repudiate that agreement.
The application was dismissed with costs.
Where acquisition orders are issued under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10] in apparent compliance with the Act and relevant regulations, such orders are valid and cannot be set aside merely on the basis that they breach an earlier undertaking or agreement between the parties. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act take precedence over any prior arrangements between the parties. An acquisition order will not be held invalid purely by virtue of breaching an earlier undertaking, unless it can be shown that the order is prima facie defective in terms of the statutory requirements.
The court observed that if the applicants had a remedy for the alleged breach of the earlier undertaking or agreement, it could not lie in seeking to set aside the acquisition orders or interdicting the respondents from exercising ownership rights. This suggests that any remedy would need to be sought through alternative legal avenues, though the court did not specify what those might be. The court also noted that the history of the undertaking or agreement was documented in the Administrative Court, but did not elaborate on the significance of those proceedings for the present application.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and land law as it establishes that statutory powers conferred by the Land Acquisition Act take precedence over prior agreements or undertakings between parties. The judgment demonstrates the supremacy of statutory provisions over contractual arrangements in the context of land acquisition, particularly during Zimbabwe's land reform program. It confirms that acquisition orders issued under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act are presumed valid if they comply with the statutory requirements on their face, and cannot be invalidated merely because they breach a prior undertaking. This case illustrates the broad powers granted to the executive in land acquisition matters and the limited scope for judicial intervention where statutory procedures have been followed.