Payns Boat Works (the applicant) alleged it leased property from the City of Harare (second respondent) since 1964. On 19 December 2016, the City of Harare resolved to maintain the lease subject to the applicant clearing outstanding rental arrears. The Minister of Local Government (first respondent) then directed the City to rescind this resolution on 15 March 2017, citing public interest concerns. On 11 April 2017, the City rescinded its earlier resolution and leased the property to Yarnfield Enterprises (third respondent), who had previously been the applicant's subtenant. The applicant was in rent arrears totaling $10,422.18 as of 30 September 2016 and had allegedly sublet portions of the property without written consent. The applicant filed this application on 12 May 2017 seeking to set aside the Minister's rescission and declare the new lease to Yarnfield invalid.
The application was dismissed with costs.
A declaratory order under section 14 of the High Court Act can only be granted where the applicant has an existing, future or contingent right in the subject matter. Once a lease has been validly terminated, the former tenant has no subsisting right capable of being declared. The Minister of Local Government acts lawfully when exercising discretion under section 314(1) of the Urban Councils Act to rescind council resolutions on public interest grounds, including where a tenant fails to pay rent and illegally sublets property. Local councils must comply with ministerial directives under section 314(3) of the Urban Councils Act. A party who materially breaches a contract cannot invoke the court's assistance to compel the innocent party to continue observing the contract. Lease agreements requiring written consent for subletting and written variations must be strictly complied with; verbal variations are ineffective.
The court observed that it is not the business of the court to compel parties to contract or to draw up contracts for them, but rather to ensure parties abide by contractual terms. A person who breaches a lease cannot move the court through the guise of a declarator to compel the innocent party to observe the contract they violated. The court noted that if the application had been filed before 11 April 2017, the applicant's case would not have been without merit. The court commented that there were material disputes of fact regarding the alleged verbal agreement to sublet and the value of improvements made to the property, which could not be resolved on the papers. The court remarked that the res ipso loquitur principle applied to the prejudice caused to the City's inhabitants by non-payment of rent.
This case clarifies the requirements for declaratory relief under section 14 of the High Court Act, emphasizing that an applicant must have an existing, future or contingent right at the time of application. It affirms the broad supervisory powers of the Minister of Local Government under section 314 of the Urban Councils Act to rescind council resolutions on public interest grounds, and confirms that local authorities are obligated to comply with such ministerial directives. The case also reinforces strict contractual principles regarding lease agreements, particularly requirements for written consent for subletting and written variations of lease terms. It demonstrates that tenants who breach fundamental lease obligations (non-payment of rent and unauthorized subletting) cannot seek equitable relief from the courts.