Mavros obtained a default judgment on 16 January 2019 in HC 11067/18 against Palchin Associates and the Gombes, declaring construction on property at Lot 1 of Subdivision P of Luna of Section 4 Borrowdale Estate (Number 1 Hawksmoor Road, Umwinsidale, Borrowdale, Harare) illegal and ordering cessation of construction. However, the Gombes did not own the property (it was owned by persons called the Galantes who were not party to proceedings), and Palchin was not a construction company and had not constructed any buildings on the property. Following the default judgment, Mavros instituted multiple applications: HC 1473/19 for contempt of court; HC 2397/19 seeking amendment of the order; and HC 4339/19 for dismissal of Palchin's rescission application for want of prosecution. Palchin and the Gombes separately sought rescission of the default judgment in HC 1737/19 and HC 2523/19 respectively, on grounds of improper service. There were serious deficiencies in service, with no proper certificate of service on Palchin, and service on the Gombes effected on their elderly mother at an incorrect address. Mavros' legal practitioners requested Palchin's lawyers hold the matter in abeyance for discussions, failed to attend scheduled meetings, then filed the dismissal application. At the hearing, Mavros consented to the Gombes' rescission application and withdrew the contempt application, but persisted with opposing Palchin's rescission and seeking dismissal for want of prosecution.
1. The application in HC 4339/19 for dismissal for want of prosecution was dismissed, with Mavros ordered to pay Palchin's costs. 2. The default judgment in HC 11067/18 dated 19 January 2019 was rescinded, with Mavros ordered to pay Palchin's costs in HC 1737/19 on the attorney-client scale. 3. Mavros was ordered to pay Palchin and the Gombes' costs in HC 1473/19 (contempt application) on the attorney-client scale.
1. A default judgment obtained in the absence of a party who was not properly served will be rescinded under Rule 449, as such judgment is granted in error when the court is unaware that proper service was not effected. 2. Certificates of service must properly indicate the address where service was effected and the responsible person who received service; defective certificates cannot support default judgments. 3. An application for dismissal for want of prosecution will not succeed where the delay is neither unreasonable nor unwarranted, and particularly where the applicant's own legal practitioners requested the matter be held in abeyance. 4. Costs on the higher attorney-client scale are warranted where a litigant's conduct constitutes unreasonable and unwarranted abuse of court process, including: pursuing litigation against parties improperly cited or against whom no valid relief can be obtained; persisting with applications lacking bona fide basis; and conduct causing unnecessary aggravation to other litigants and inconvenience to the court and administration of justice. 5. Legal practitioners owe duties of probity and honesty in their dealings with opposing counsel; conduct lacking integrity and ethics will be frowned upon by the court.
The court made several strong obiter observations about the conduct of Mavros' legal practitioners, describing the situation as "a dog's breakfast of unparalleled confusion and ineptitude" and stating their conduct "leaves a lot to be desired, and in fact, raises questions about their integrity and ethics." The court noted it would have been "hard pressed not to consider a claim for costs on the higher scale" had it been requested in the dismissal application. The court observed that the amended certificate of service "was a clear intention to sanitize improper service." The court described Mavros' counsel's submissions in the costs argument as amounting to "a threat of continuing with the application if Palchin does not accede to ordinary costs" and characterized this as "arrogant abuse of process." The court emphasized that "the court must frown at such conduct by legal practitioners" who act without probity. The judgment noted that seeking a demolition order in contempt proceedings that goes beyond the original order, while simultaneously seeking to amend that order, demonstrated the unreasonable nature of the litigation strategy.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for establishing strict standards regarding proper service of court processes and consequences for abuse of court process. It demonstrates the court's willingness to impose costs on the higher attorney-client scale where litigants engage in unreasonable, unwarranted conduct that amounts to gross abuse of process, including: filing applications against parties improperly cited; pursuing litigation based on defective service; making parties to proceedings where no valid relief can be obtained against them; and legal practitioners acting without probity in dealing with opposing counsel. The judgment reinforces that the court will scrutinize certificates of service and rescind default judgments obtained through improper service. It also highlights ethical obligations of legal practitioners in their dealings with opposing counsel and consequences for misleading conduct. The case serves as a warning against using multiple, overlapping applications to harass opponents and clog the administration of justice.