Patrick Matimba v Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) Limited

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a Shift Boss. Sometime in 2018, while performing his duties barring down a rock, an accident occurred where a rock fell on him. He sustained injuries including lumbar lordosis, central intervertebral disc protrusion at LA, and mild to moderate lateral stenosis. On the same day he was taken to the mine's medical centre where an X-ray did not reveal anything. Two days later, due to excruciating pain, he was referred to a specialist neuro surgeon and an MRI scan was conducted which revealed the extent of his injuries including loss of one of his discs. The plaintiff has been receiving treatment for these injuries. On 13 May 2022, the plaintiff issued summons claiming ZWL $60,000,000.00 in damages for pain and suffering. The defendant filed a special plea in bar on 31 May 2022, arguing that the claim had prescribed as more than three years had elapsed since the accident in 2018.

• Whether the plaintiff's claim for damages had prescribed in terms of section 15(d) of the Prescription Act [Chapter 8:11]
• When did the cause of action arise for purposes of prescription - in 2018 when the accident occurred and injuries were diagnosed, or in 2021 when the plaintiff allegedly became aware of permanent disability
• Whether the defendant interrupted prescription by preventing the plaintiff from approaching the court

The special plea in bar was upheld. The plaintiff's claim was dismissed as it had prescribed. The plaintiff was ordered to bear the defendant's costs on the legal practitioner and client scale (higher scale).

In terms of section 15(d) of the Prescription Act [Chapter 8:11], a debt (claim for damages) prescribes after three years. Prescription commences to run as soon as a debt is due, which is when the plaintiff becomes aware of the material facts giving rise to the claim. Where a plaintiff's own pleadings reveal that he became aware of his injuries and their extent (including permanent disability) shortly after an accident through diagnostic tests, the cause of action arises at that time, not at some later date when further confirmation of those injuries is obtained. A claim instituted more than three years after the plaintiff became aware of the material facts is prescribed and must be dismissed.

The court observed that costs on a higher scale (legal practitioner and client scale) were appropriate because the plaintiff ought to have been "jolted to withdraw his claim" after the prescription issue was raised by the defendant, but instead persisted with a claim that was clearly prescribed. This suggests that parties who persist with clearly unsustainable claims after fundamental defects are pointed out may face punitive cost orders.

This case reinforces the strict application of prescription periods under the Prescription Act in Zimbabwe, particularly in workplace injury claims. It emphasizes that the cause of action arises when the plaintiff becomes aware of the material facts giving rise to the claim, not when further medical information becomes available about injuries already known. The case serves as a warning to litigants to timeously institute claims and not to persist with clearly prescribed claims, as evidenced by the award of costs on a higher scale.