Passionate Fuza and Jonah Wakurawarehwa v The Parliament of Zimbabwe and The President of Zimbabwe N.O.

The applicants, two citizens associated with civic society, challenged the validity of the Private Voluntary Organisations Act 2025. After the Bill was gazetted on 1 March 2024, Parliament scheduled ten public hearings throughout Zimbabwe's provinces. The applicants attended separate meetings in Harare and Masvingo respectively. They alleged both meetings were disrupted and ended abruptly before they and other members of the public could make meaningful contributions. The Bill was subsequently passed and assented to by the President on 11 April 2025. A similar earlier application by Farai Maguwu in July 2024 was struck off as premature. The applicants then brought this application under s 167(2)(d) of the Constitution, alleging Parliament failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation under s 141(a) to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process.

• Whether the applicants had locus standi to bring an application under section 167(2)(d) of the Constitution
• Whether the dispute became moot after the Bill was enacted into law
• Whether the second respondent (President) was properly cited as a party to the proceedings
• What onus rests on an applicant alleging Parliament failed to fulfil its obligation under section 141(a) to facilitate public involvement
• Whether Parliament failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation under section 141(a) to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process that resulted in the Private Voluntary Organisations Act 2025
• Whether alleged disruptions at two of ten public meetings constituted a failure to facilitate public involvement

1. The application is dismissed. 2. There shall be no order as to costs.

An applicant alleging Parliament failed to fulfil its obligation under section 141(a) to facilitate public involvement must demonstrate either: (a) that Parliament did not involve the public at all in the legislative process, or (b) that Parliament's facilitation was merely token and lacked substance. Where alleging inadequate facilitation, the applicant must reference the entire range of measures taken by Parliament and demonstrate how the cumulative effect of all measures failed to meet the constitutional threshold. The right created by section 141 is a public right, not an individual right - it grants the public the right to be afforded an opportunity to be engaged, not a right for every citizen to be individually heard. Parliament retains discretion to determine the methodology by which the public will be involved, subject to judicial review for adequacy. Disruption of some participation mechanisms does not establish constitutional failure where Parliament provided multiple adequate avenues for public involvement. The validity of legislation challenged on grounds of procedural defects in the legislative process is not rendered moot by the Bill's enactment, as the Act's validity depends on the integrity of the process that produced it.

The Court observed that section 141 creates an "obligation" rather than merely a "duty" - this is a justiciable and mandatory requirement enforceable under s 167(2)(d), not merely an aspirational duty. The Court noted approvingly that the Sedley principles from English administrative law (established in R v London Borough of Brent Ex parte Gunning) regarding legitimate consultation may be adapted to assess adequacy of public participation in the legislative context. The Court distinguished between joinder in constitutional matters under s 167(2)(d) and joinder at common law, noting that s 167 joinder is narrower and based on demonstrable failure to fulfil specific constitutional obligations, not mere interest in the subject matter. The Court emphasized that section 141 represents "a delicate balancing act between preserving some measure of autonomy on the part of Parliament to legislate and granting the public the right to be involved in the legislative process," reflecting an attenuation of Parliament's previously supreme and sovereign power to legislate.

This judgment establishes important precedents in Zimbabwean constitutional law regarding challenges to legislation based on alleged failures of public participation. It clarifies: (1) the distinction between individual rights enforcement under s 85(1) and enforcement of Parliament's constitutional obligations under s 167(2)(d); (2) that the right to public involvement in legislative processes under s 141 is a collective public right, not an individual right; (3) the onus on applicants to demonstrate either complete absence of facilitation or that facilitation was merely token across all measures taken; (4) that disruption of some public participation mechanisms does not automatically constitute failure where Parliament provided multiple avenues for involvement; (5) proper citation requirements in s 167(2)(d) applications - respondents must have specific allegations made against them showing failure to fulfil constitutional obligations; (6) that challenges to legislative processes based on procedural defects are not moot once the Bill becomes law, as validity depends on process integrity; and (7) the framework for assessing adequacy of public participation (referencing Sedley principles). The judgment represents a significant articulation of how courts should balance parliamentary autonomy with constitutional obligations for public participation.