NMB Bank Limited (fifth respondent) obtained judgment against Auto Deco Paints (Pvt) Ltd (first respondent) and others for $215,532.76 plus interest in case HC 1087/11 on 11 July 2012. A writ of execution was issued on 29 January 2013, and the Sheriff attached the first respondent's immovable property, Stand 867 Strathaven Township, on 3 May 2013. The sale was scheduled for 20 June 2014. Meanwhile, Parkview Trading (applicant) had obtained an order on 27 February 2014 in case HC 5845/13 directing the first respondent to sell "Stand 869 Strathaven Township" and share the proceeds. The applicant approached the court on an urgent basis seeking an order that the Sheriff reserve 50% of the proceeds from the sale based on its prior order. The property advertised for sale was Stand 867, not Stand 869 as referenced in the applicant's judgment. The applicant claimed this was a typographical error.
The application for urgent relief was dismissed with costs awarded to the fifth respondent.
An applicant cannot approach a court on an urgent basis when the relief sought is dependent on the correction of a prior judgment that has not yet been rectified. To succeed in an urgent chamber application, an applicant must show imminent danger to existing rights or a legitimate interest in the property concerned. Where an applicant has no existing rights or legitimate interest (such as where they are not a joint owner and their court order refers to a different property), they cannot demonstrate irreparable harm sufficient to justify urgent relief. Litigants must refrain from seeking relief in an urgent manner where such relief is dependent on the conclusion of an action launched or to be launched.
The court distinguished between a mere typographical error in a judgment and an error that appears throughout the founding documents of an application, noting that the latter is more fundamental than a simple typographical mistake. The court also observed that the applicant's intended correction of the judgment was a matter that should be completed before urgent relief based on that judgment could be sought.
This case establishes important principles in Zimbabwean law regarding the requirements for urgent applications, particularly that: (1) applicants must have their procedural house in order before seeking urgent relief; (2) relief dependent on correcting errors in prior judgments cannot be sought urgently before those corrections are made; and (3) applicants must demonstrate existing rights or legitimate interests, not merely potential future rights, to establish urgency and avoid irreparable harm. The case reinforces strict adherence to the Tripple C. Pigs test for urgency.