The plaintiff and defendant, whose directors were close friends, entered into business dealings. Plaintiff sold coal to defendant at defendant's request at a discounted price of $50 per tonne. Defendant made initial cash payments totaling $12,000. According to a reconciliation signed by both parties, defendant had drawn coal worth $92,268 and provided transportation services worth $134,064, less fuel worth $77,934.15 provided by plaintiff, leaving a net transportation charge. After offsetting the transportation charges against coal purchases and deducting the $12,000 cash payment, $24,148.15 remained outstanding. Defendant's representative signed the reconciliation and wrote "to be offset" on it. The parties disagreed on the nature of their contract: plaintiff claimed it was a sale with payment due in cash, while defendant argued it was a barter/exchange agreement whereby the debt would be discharged through provision of transport services. Defendant admitted owing $24,148.15 but disputed that it was payable in cash.
1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $24,148.15 plus interest at the prescribed rate from 7 October 2016. 2. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff's costs on the ordinary scale.
Where parties enter into separate concurrent contracts - one for the sale of goods and another for the provision of services - and agree to set off reciprocal debts arising from performance of those contracts, this does not constitute a contract of barter or exchange. The agreements remain separate and distinct with different terms, conditions and prices. Set-off is merely a method of extinguishing reciprocal debts and may be regarded as equivalent to payment in cash. A party claiming specific performance under a contract of sale is entitled to payment in cash where, after set-off of reciprocal obligations, a debt remains outstanding. Set-off as a defence can only exist where there is an existing reciprocal obligation owed by the plaintiff to the defendant, not merely an offer to discharge debt through future services.
The court expressed regret that both counsel failed to file closing submissions as undertaken, particularly given counsel's acknowledgment that submissions on the law relating to contracts of barter were of particular importance due to the apparent absence of post-independence jurisprudence in that area. The court observed that it was 'amazing how only two people who are friends and were engaged in simple and straight forward business transactions can differ so much on what was intended' and noted that 'either both are, or one of them is being dishonest.' The judge remarked that there was 'no need for the court or the parties' lawyers to employ legal gymnastics to call laymen's business transactions by names or a name not intended by them just in order to shoot down a legitimate claim arising from the simple business deal. It is like calling a dog by a bad name as a pretext for shooting it dead.'
This judgment clarifies Zimbabwean law on the distinction between contracts of sale with set-off arrangements and contracts of barter/exchange. It establishes that where parties have concurrent contracts (e.g., one for supply of goods, another for supply of services) and agree to set off reciprocal debts for convenience, this does not convert the agreements into a single contract of barter. The case reinforces that courts must determine the true nature of contracts by examining the parties' pleadings, admissions, and the substance of their agreements, not merely labels applied by counsel. It also confirms that set-off as a defence requires an existing reciprocal debt, not merely a promise of future services. The judgment is significant for commercial transactions involving ongoing business relationships where parties engage in multiple types of dealings simultaneously.