On 24 July 2018, Lazarus Chitsungo took his vehicle, a blue Chevrolet Trailblazer, for service to William and Hunt in Pretoria, South Africa. When he returned to collect it, he was advised it had been stolen and shown CCTV footage of the theft. On 8 August 2018, two weeks after the theft, the appellant was found in possession of the stolen vehicle at the corner of South Avenue and Second Street, Harare, Zimbabwe. Police recovered from the vehicle a temporary import permit (TIP) in the appellant's name, a South African vehicle plate bearing number HDZ092MP, and a Zimbabwean number plate ADA 3573 relating to a different Trailblazer registered to a Zimbabwean company. The appellant's defence was that he was not in South Africa when the vehicle was stolen and had purchased it from one Isaac Cheza for USD25,000, paying a deposit of USD18,000. He produced an agreement of sale dated 27 July 2018 (three days after the theft) and a copy of Cheza's identification card. He claimed Cheza had processed the TIP for him and retained clearance documents.
The appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Theft is a continuing offence, and a person found in possession of property stolen in another country can be prosecuted in Zimbabwe as a co-perpetrator; (2) Under s 196 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, a person who exercises physical control over stolen property with knowledge that it is stolen, acting in common purpose with the original thieves, qualifies as a co-perpetrator even if not present at the original theft; (3) Under s 123 of the Code, a person found in recent possession of stolen property who fails to give a reasonable explanation shall be guilty of theft or receiving stolen property; (4) In applying the cardinal rules from R v Blom regarding circumstantial evidence, all proved facts must be consistent with guilt and exclude every reasonable inference save that of guilt; (5) The onus rests on the State to disprove an explanation given by an accused beyond reasonable doubt, and a court will only convict where the explanation is false beyond any doubt; (6) Commercial transactions involving substantial sums require documentation and due diligence consistent with ordinary business prudence, and the absence of such can support an inference of guilty knowledge.
CHATUKUTA J made important observations about cross-border vehicle theft, noting that such crimes are on the increase and endorsing the remarks of DUMBUTSHENA CJ in S v Dube & Anor (1989) that "Cross-border thefts, especially of motor vehicles, are on the increase." The court observed that these remarks from thirty years prior "held true and still hold true as to date" and that "Cross-border thefts are still continuing unabated." The court also commented on the poor investigation and prosecution of the case by the State, noting that police should have traced Cheza through the cellphone number via the service provider rather than simply phoning the number, and that the TIP should have been produced as an exhibit. However, the court noted that these investigative shortcomings did not detract from the strength of the circumstantial evidence against the appellant. The court made the observation that "one does not buy a vehicle as if buying a loaf of bread," emphasizing the need for proper due diligence in high-value transactions.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal law for several reasons: (1) it affirms that theft is a continuing offence and cross-border thieves can be prosecuted in Zimbabwe for property stolen in neighboring countries; (2) it provides clear guidance on evaluating circumstantial evidence in cases involving possession of recently stolen property; (3) it illustrates how co-perpetrator liability under s 196 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act applies to persons who join a criminal enterprise after the initial theft through common purpose; (4) it demonstrates judicial concern about cross-border vehicle theft and the need for robust prosecution; (5) it reinforces that commercial prudence and common sense can be used to evaluate the credibility of defences involving high-value transactions; (6) it clarifies the application of s 123 of the Code regarding possession of stolen property and the burden on the accused to provide reasonable explanation.