The applicant and respondent were married on 8 December 1989 under the Marriage Act with two minor children. The applicant resided in the United Kingdom working as a nurse while the respondent resided in Zimbabwe. On 7 May 2010, the respondent issued summons for divorce. The applicant was personally served on 18 February 2011 and filed an appearance to defend on 25 February 2011 through her attorneys Mujeyi Manokore Attorneys. On 23 March 2011, the respondent filed a notice to plead and intention to bar which was served on the applicant's attorneys. The applicant failed to file a plea and was barred on 11 April 2011. The matter was set down on the unopposed roll with notice served on 4 May 2011. On 19 May 2011, Chitakunye J granted a default divorce order including distribution of matrimonial assets, custody of children to the applicant, and maintenance. On 13 June 2011, the applicant filed an application for rescission of the default judgment, claiming the distribution of matrimonial assets was unfair.
The application for rescission of the default divorce judgment granted on 19 May 2011 was dismissed with costs.
For rescission of a default judgment under Order 9 Rule 63 of the High Court Rules, an applicant must establish good and sufficient cause by demonstrating: (1) a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the default; (2) bona fides in bringing the application; and (3) a bona fide defence on the merits with prospects of success. A client cannot avoid the consequences of their chosen legal practitioner's negligence or failure to comply with procedural rules - such conduct constitutes wilful non-compliance attributable to the client. Service of court processes on a party's legal practitioners of record at the address of service chosen by that party satisfies personal notice requirements under the rules. In applications to rescind orders distributing matrimonial assets, mere assertions of unfairness without specific engagement with the relevant statutory factors are insufficient to establish prospects of success.
The court quoted with approval the maxim 'vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subvenient' (the law will help the vigilant but not the sluggard), reminding the legal profession of their duty of vigilance in protecting clients' interests. The court observed that it would be absurd to require service of a notice of set down on both a represented party and their legal practitioners when the party has given the legal practitioners' address as their address of service. The court also noted that the applicant could have pursued other domestic remedies regarding the maintenance order, including appeal or variation proceedings, rather than seeking rescission of the divorce order incorporating that maintenance provision.
This Zimbabwean case provides guidance on the stringent requirements for rescission of default judgments in matrimonial matters, particularly emphasizing that clients cannot escape the consequences of their legal practitioners' failures and negligence. It reinforces that unsubstantiated allegations of unfairness in distribution of matrimonial assets, without specific engagement with the statutory factors under section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, will not establish prospects of success. The case also clarifies service requirements under the rules, holding that service on legal practitioners of record at the client's chosen address of service satisfies notice requirements even where the client resides abroad. While this is a Zimbabwean judgment, it may have persuasive value in South African courts dealing with similar procedural issues in family law matters.