Oscar Boma and Lameck Mwanza v Commissioner General of Zimbabwe Republic Police and Chairman of the Police Service Commission

The applicants were serving members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police stationed at Sauerstown Police Station, Bulawayo, holding the ranks of Sergeant and Constable respectively. On 6 March 2009, Philip Sithole reported a robbery at Sauerstown Police Station after being turned away at Luveve Police Station. The applicants took his report and accompanied Sithole to recover stolen property from suspects in Cowdray Park. However, instead of arresting the robbery suspects, the applicants recovered some property and received 200 Rands and 4 litres of cooking oil from one suspect, Ephraim Shoko, presumably to protect him from arrest and prosecution. The applicants appeared to conduct a private investigation. On 12 October 2011, they appeared before a police disciplinary tribunal charged with contravening paragraph 34 of the Schedule to the Police Act (omitting or neglecting to perform duty or performing duty in an improper manner). They pleaded not guilty but were convicted and sentenced to 12 and 5 days imprisonment with labour respectively. Their appeal to the Commissioner General was unsuccessful. A Board of Inquiry (Suitability Board) was convened under section 50 of the Police Act, which recommended their discharge. They were discharged on 1 August 2011. Their appeal to the Police Service Commission was also unsuccessful, leading them to seek review before the High Court.

• Whether the decision to discharge the applicants was in accordance with the law
• Whether there was bias by the Board of Inquiry members
• Whether the confirmation of the discharge by the Police Service Commission was in accordance with the law
• Whether the disciplinary trial and Board of Inquiry were conducted fairly and in accordance with the Constitution of Zimbabwe

The application for review was dismissed with no order as to costs explicitly stated in the judgment.

The binding principles established are: (1) A Board of Inquiry convened under section 50(3) of the Schedule to the Police Act is properly constituted where it complies with the statutory requirements, particularly that no officer who is a material witness or has a personal interest in the matter is appointed; (2) Allegations of bias against members of an administrative tribunal or board must be proved by concrete evidence and cannot be inferred from innocuous conduct such as members conversing with each other; (3) The Police Service Commission has the statutory mandate to scrutinize all evidence presented to it in appeals from discharges by the Commissioner General, and its decisions made in accordance with sections 51 and 55 of the Police Act will not be interfered with on review absent illegality or procedural unfairness; (4) The recommendations of a Board of Inquiry are not final decisions - the ultimate decision-making power rests with the Commissioner General under section 50(3) of the Schedule to the Police Act.

Makonese J observed that the applicants were fortunate not to have been criminally prosecuted for more serious offences such as obstructing the course of justice and corruption, given that they had received money and goods from suspects and failed to arrest them. The judge further commented that the background facts suggested an abuse of court process by the applicants in pursuing the review application, as they did not have a viable defence to the allegations against them and the allegations were serious in nature.

This case clarifies the procedural requirements and judicial review standards applicable to police disciplinary proceedings in Zimbabwe. It confirms that internal police disciplinary processes, including Boards of Inquiry convened under section 50 of the Police Act and appeals to the Police Service Commission, will be upheld by courts on review where they comply with statutory requirements. The judgment emphasizes that allegations of bias in administrative tribunals must be substantiated with concrete evidence and cannot be based on mere inference or suspicion. While this is a Zimbabwean case and not binding in South African courts, it addresses similar administrative law principles regarding disciplinary processes, procedural fairness, and the standard of review applicable to decisions of statutory bodies in the employment context.