Olinda Chawora was employed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe since 1980, serving as Division Chief in charge of Financial Markets. She was suspended from service on 22 September 2004 and subsequently charged with habitual and/or substantial neglect of duty and gross incompetence or inefficiency in the performance of work in terms of section 4.2.3(g) and (h) of the respondent's Code of Conduct. Following prolonged correspondence between the parties concerning the alleged misconduct and failed attempts to negotiate an exit package, Chawora approached the High Court seeking an order declaring the disciplinary proceedings a nullity and compelling the respondent to comply with provisions of Statutory Instrument 186 of 2003, Labour Relations (Retrenchment Regulations) 2003.
The application was dismissed with costs.
The binding legal principle is that although the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction and this has not been completely ousted by the Labour Relations Act, applications seeking orders to set aside employment suspensions and compelling compliance with labour regulations are substantive labour matters that fall within the exclusive first-instance jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 89 of the Labour Relations Act. An application does not fall within the High Court's declaratory jurisdiction merely because it is framed as seeking a declaratory order when it is substantively seeking orders that are properly within the Labour Court's jurisdiction.
Karwi J made obiter observations on the competing approaches in previous cases regarding the Labour Court's jurisdiction. The court expressed the view that the approach in Thomas Juso v City of Harare was "cursory and simplistic" and preferred the approach in Martin Sibanda v Bensen Chinemhute, which correctly recognized that there is no law in Zimbabwe that has completely ousted the High Court's jurisdiction in labour matters and that the High Court retains its review jurisdiction and jurisdiction to issue declaratory orders. The court also noted the general principle that superior courts jealously guard their jurisdiction and there exists a presumption against ouster of the court's jurisdiction unless the legislature states so in very clear terms, citing South African authority that statutes purporting to oust jurisdiction must be restrictively interpreted.
This case contributes to Zimbabwean jurisprudence on the demarcation of jurisdiction between the High Court and the Labour Court following the establishment of the Labour Court as a superior court in 2003. It clarifies that while the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction and there is no complete ouster of its powers in labour matters, applications that are substantively labour-related and seek orders (rather than true declaratory relief) must be brought in the Labour Court in the first instance. The judgment demonstrates the court's approach to distinguishing between genuine declaratory applications within the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and substantive labour law claims dressed as declaratory applications.