On 18 August 2015, the maintenance court ordered the first respondent to pay $2,050 per month as maintenance for a child, Mohsin Akram, whom he allegedly sired with the applicant. The applicant was subsequently arraigned before the criminal court on charges of forgery, extortion and fraud. She was fined $300 for allegedly falsifying Mohsin's birth certificates and ordered to restitute $6,000 paid through the maintenance order. She appealed her conviction and sentence. On 28 September 2015, the first respondent applied for discharge of the maintenance order based on the applicant's conviction. On 16 October 2015, the applicant applied for variation of the maintenance order. Both applications were set to be heard on the same date by the second respondent magistrate. On 29 February 2016, the second respondent heard the discharge application and suspended the maintenance order pending the hearing and determination of the applicant's criminal appeal. The applicant sought review of this decision on grounds of gross irregularity.
The application for review was granted as prayed. The second respondent's order suspending the maintenance order pending determination of the criminal appeal was set aside.
A maintenance court, as a creature of statute, cannot exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Maintenance Act [Chapter 5:09] and must determine matters strictly within the four corners of that Act. Section 27(3)(c) of the Maintenance Act, which allows suspension of orders pending appeals, applies only to appeals processed through the maintenance court under the Maintenance Act and cannot be extended by parity of reasoning to criminal appeals. Where an application for discharge of a maintenance order is brought, the court must apply section 8 of the Maintenance Act and either dismiss the application under subsection (5)(a) if frivolous/vexatious or discharge the order under subsection (7)(a) if meritorious. A court cannot suspend a maintenance order based on a pending criminal appeal when the relief sought was discharge. Conduct that prevents a fair trial of the issues constitutes gross irregularity justifying review, regardless of whether the conduct was well-intentioned or bona fide though mistaken.
Mangota J observed that the second respondent's decision was 'so outrageous in its defiance of logic and reason that no sensible court which applied its mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at the conclusion which he reached.' The court noted that the second respondent's process of reasoning caused him to traverse outside his jurisdiction. The judge also commented that the opening section of the second respondent's judgment was unclear. The court referenced the test for gross irregularity from Pondoro (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v Nemakonde & Anor, 2008 (1) ZLR 6, noting that 'the crucial question is whether it prevented a fair trial of the issues.'
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law as it clarifies the limits of a maintenance court's jurisdiction under the Maintenance Act [Chapter 5:09]. It establishes that maintenance courts, as creatures of statute, cannot go outside the four corners of the Maintenance Act to determine matters on bases not provided for in the Act. The case demonstrates that section 27(3)(c) of the Maintenance Act applies only to appeals within the maintenance court system and cannot be extended by analogy to criminal appeals. It reinforces the principle that courts must apply the correct statutory provisions and cannot adopt a 'middle-of-the-road approach' not contemplated by the governing legislation. The judgment also provides guidance on what constitutes 'gross irregularity' sufficient to warrant review under section 27 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], emphasizing that conduct preventing a fair trial of issues amounts to gross irregularity regardless of good intentions.