Dodhill (Pvt) Ltd owned Dodhill Farm. Following litigation with the Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement, a court order by consent divided the farm into two portions - one acquired by the Minister and one left in Dodhill's ownership. The Minister subsequently acquired or purported to acquire the portion previously agreed to remain with Dodhill under s 16B(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution. The Minister allocated this portion to Chikafu via an offer letter. Upon acquisition, Dodhill was required to vacate within 90 days, but both the 45-day period to cease farming operations and 90-day period to vacate expired, yet Dodhill continued to occupy. Chikafu moved onto the farm and Dodhill launched an urgent chamber application for his removal based on mandament van spolie (spoliation). The High Court (BERE J) granted a provisional order concluding that while the farm was legally acquired and legally offered to Chikafu, he could not move onto the farm without due process under the Land Acquisition Act. BERE J refused Chikafu's application for leave to appeal on the ground that he had no prospects of success. Chikafu then applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal.
Leave to appeal granted. The notice of appeal was to be filed within fifteen days of the handing down of the reasons for judgment.
Where there is a divergence of judicial authorities on a legal issue, with decided cases supporting both parties' contentions, a party has prospects of success on appeal sufficient to warrant granting leave to appeal. A judge faced with conflicting precedents from coordinate courts should facilitate resolution of the legal uncertainty by enabling appeal to the highest court. Furthermore, an order that definitively interdicts a party from specific conduct (rather than preserving the status quo pending further proceedings) is final in nature regardless of being labeled as "provisional," and a party may appeal such an order as of right without requiring leave.
The Chief Justice expressed concern about the undesirable situation created when different judges of the same court reach different conclusions on the same legal issue, creating uncertainty in the law. The CJ noted that Dodhill did not cross-appeal against the finding that the farm belonged to the Minister, likely because having succeeded in keeping Chikafu out, they saw no point in pursuing that issue. The judgment also provided a detailed survey of the orthodox principles of mandament van spolie as articulated in cases like Nino Bonino v De Lange (establishing that no one may dispossess another forcibly without due process) and Chisveto (stating that even a robber or thief is entitled to restoration of possession, as lawfulness of possession does not enter into spoliation). The CJ implicitly endorsed the High Court's rejection of the minority approach in Parker v Mobil Oil and Coetzee v Coetzee (South African cases suggesting courts should consider whether an applicant has some plausible claim to property) in favor of the orthodox view that the juridical nature of possession is irrelevant in spoliation applications.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence because it addresses a fundamental tension between traditional common law spoliation remedies and land reform imperatives. It highlights the divergence in judicial approaches to whether unlawful occupation can defeat a spoliation claim - a critical issue in the context of Zimbabwe's land acquisition program. The case recognizes that conflicting High Court precedents on this issue create legal uncertainty requiring Supreme Court clarification. It also demonstrates the distinction between truly interlocutory orders and final judgments despite labeling, affecting appeal rights. The case is particularly important in land reform contexts where statutory time limits for vacating acquired land interact with common law possession remedies.