The applicants sought rescission of a judgment granted under HC 9608/16. The first applicant was a private limited company, the second applicant was its Managing Director, and applicants 2-4 were shareholders. The second applicant and respondent were a divorced couple. In the prior proceedings (HC 9608/16), the respondent had obtained a liquidation order against the applicants after they were deemed to have been barred for allegedly not filing heads of argument. The court in HC 9608/16 concluded that the applicants had not filed heads of argument and treated the matter as unopposed, despite the applicants being present and making oral submissions. The index to the record in HC 9608/16 clearly showed that the applicants' heads of argument had been filed timeously at pages 145-158, but the presiding judge overlooked this and proceeded on the erroneous basis that no heads had been filed and that the applicants were barred.
The application for rescission of the judgment under HC 9608/16 was granted. Costs were ordered to be in the cause.
A judgment is erroneously granted within the meaning of Order 49 Rule 449(1)(a) of the High Court Rules, 1971 where the court proceeds on a mistaken factual basis that is fundamental to its decision. Where a court treats an application as unopposed and bars a party on the erroneous belief that heads of argument were not filed, when in fact they were timeously filed as shown in the record, the resulting judgment is liable to be rescinded. Under Rule 449(1)(a), the sole inquiry is whether the judgment was entered in error; the court is not concerned with whether there is good and sufficient cause or a prima facie defense (as required under Rule 63). The indication in the court index that heads of argument form part of the record should not be brushed aside by the court.
The court made observations about the respondent's suggestion that only the last two paragraphs of the judgment should be expunged rather than the entire judgment being rescinded, questioning how one could remove or sever only a portion of a judgment that goes to the root of the order. The court also commented that the amendment to properly reflect the first applicant as a private limited company would not occasion prejudice to the respondent given that the original order under HC 9608/16 correctly spelled out the company name. The court noted that the respondent's concession that portions of the judgment were erroneous went to the root of the matter and was effectively a concession of error in judgment.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean civil procedure as it clarifies the distinction between rescission under Rule 449(1)(a) (judgment erroneously granted) and Rule 63 (default judgment). It demonstrates that where a court proceeds on a fundamentally mistaken factual basis (such as believing heads of argument were not filed when they were), the resulting judgment is liable to be rescinded under Rule 449(1)(a). The case emphasizes the importance of courts ensuring that the record before them is accurate before making adverse findings against parties, and reinforces the audi alteram partem principle in civil proceedings. It also shows that even where a party has been heard orally, if the court's ultimate decision is based on an erroneous factual finding (non-filing of heads), the judgment remains susceptible to rescission.