The applicant was the Town Clerk of the City of Harare. A commission consisting of the 1st to 8th respondents had been appointed to run the affairs of the City of Harare instead of an elected council. This commission had its lifespan extended on several occasions and was serving its fourth term. The 1st respondent, as chairperson of the commission, purported to exercise the statutory powers of a Mayor and suspended the applicant in terms of section 139 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]. The commission then appointed the 9th to 11th respondents as an inquiring committee to investigate the applicant's suspension. The applicant challenged the legality of: (1) the reappointment of the commission to serve a fourth term; (2) the appointment of the inquiring committee; (3) the 1st respondent's purported exercise of mayoral powers; and (4) his suspension by the commission.
The application succeeded. The court granted the declaratur as set out in the draft order: (1) The reappointment of the commission to serve a fourth term was declared unlawful, null, void and of no force and effect; (2) The appointment of the inquiring committee was declared unlawful, null, void and of no force and effect; (3) The 1st respondent was declared not to be, at law, a Mayor of Harare and could not lawfully discharge mayoral functions or exercise statutory powers; (4) The purported suspension of the applicant was declared unlawful, null, void and of no force and effect; (5) The commission was declared to have no authority to make decisions adversely affecting the applicant's contractual and statutory rights as Town Clerk; (6) The 1st, 12th and 13th respondents were ordered to pay costs jointly and severally.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 80(5) of the Urban Councils Act was enacted as a temporary measure to be used during the period preceding elections, not as a mechanism to avoid or postpone general elections indefinitely through continual reappointment of commissioners; (2) The Minister cannot lawfully avoid holding a general election of councillors by continually re-appointing commissioners; (3) Reappointment of commissioners beyond the statutorily intended temporary period is unlawful; (4) A chairperson of a commission cannot exercise the statutory powers of a Mayor, as those powers can only be exercised by an elected Mayor or Deputy Mayor acting in the Mayor's stead; (5) Acts done by an unlawfully constituted commission, including suspensions and appointments, are null, void and of no force and effect; (6) Courts cannot retrospectively validate illegal administrative acts - that function belongs to Parliament.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The allegations regarding the 1st respondent's claimed expenses at Wild Geese Lodge and purchases of groceries and alcohol at the City's expense were irrelevant to the main issues and would only serve to cloud the matters to be determined; (2) The court expressed approval of the reasoning in previous High Court judgments (Combined Harare Residents Association and Christopher Zvobgo cases) and found their reasoning appealing; (3) The court observed that even if the Stevenson judgment were considered obiter dictum, it was highly unlikely that a different conclusion would be reached if section 80 were argued again in the Supreme Court; (4) The court noted that while it was conceded the illegal commission transacted business under genuine but mistaken belief of lawful mandate, such mistaken belief provided no legal basis for the court to validate what Parliament decreed illegal; (5) The court commented that unscrambling the actions of the illegal commission (salaries paid, rates levied and collected, services rendered) was 'simply unimaginable' but that this practical difficulty did not justify judicial validation of illegal acts.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and local government law as it reinforces the principle that statutory powers must be exercised within their intended scope and purpose. It establishes that section 80(5) of the Urban Councils Act cannot be used to circumvent democratic elections by indefinitely reappointing commissioners. The judgment affirms the judiciary's role in upholding the rule of law and the separation of powers, refusing to validate illegal administrative actions even when done in good faith. It confirms that courts will not fill legislative vacuums or retrospectively validate unlawful acts - that function belongs to Parliament. The case also clarifies that only a properly elected Mayor, not a commission chairperson, can exercise statutory mayoral powers. It demonstrates the courts' commitment to protecting democratic processes in local government and ensuring accountability of executive actions.