The applicant served in the Zimbabwe Police Force for over 19 years. On 15 November 2010, a Board of Inquiry sat to determine his suitability to remain in the force. The inquiry arose from the following: On 2 September 2010, the applicant appeared before a single officer facing two counts - acting in an unbecoming manner prejudicial to good order and being absent without official leave. He was sentenced to 14 days imprisonment for both counts. The circumstances were that he received USD 600 as an exhibit for a theft report and converted it to his own use, then failed to report for duty the next day. He was also facing a criminal charge of theft and was on bail. The applicant suffered from schizophrenia since 1996 and was re-examined by a psychiatric specialist in October 2010, who confirmed that his mental illness may affect his concentration and execution of duties. The Board recommended his discharge from the force with effect from 10 November 2010 for being "unsuitable for police duties". The Police Service Commission discharged him on 15 December 2010.
1. The decision of the Police Service Commission to discharge Constable Nicholas Mudzingwa from the Police Force was set aside. 2. The applicant was reinstated to his position from the date of discharge. 3. The respondent was ordered to pay costs of suit.
Where a Board of Inquiry established under section 49 of the Police Act to determine suitability for continued service improperly considers a member's medical/mental condition as a basis for discharge, it exceeds its jurisdiction because section 20 of the Police Act provides a specific and exclusive procedure for discharge on medical grounds. That procedure requires certification by a board of medical practitioners appointed by the Secretary responsible for health. A Board of Inquiry has no capacity to deal with issues relating to a member's mental condition as a basis for discharge. It is irregular and unlawful to mix the requirements of sections 20 and 49 of the Police Act. Such a decision is reviewable and liable to be set aside, with the affected member being entitled to reinstatement.
The court observed that the applicant had continued to carry out his duties without any complaints from the authorities from 1996 (when he was first diagnosed with mental illness) until 2010. The court also noted that while there was a pending criminal case against the applicant, the charges under the Police Act had been proved against him. The court acknowledged the applicant's mental condition and his statement that it may have affected his recollection of events and ability to appreciate the consequences of the Board of Inquiry, though he did not plead incapacity to follow the proceedings at the time. The court further noted that the respondent's opposing affidavit made no reference to the applicant's mental condition, effectively disabling the Board from denying that its decision took this factor into account.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and labour law (particularly applicable to South African jurisprudence given similar administrative law principles) as it establishes important principles regarding: (1) the proper procedure for discharge of police officers on medical grounds versus disciplinary grounds; (2) the requirement that administrative bodies must act within their statutory jurisdiction and not conflate different statutory procedures; (3) the protection of employees with mental health conditions from improper discharge procedures; and (4) the court's willingness to intervene where administrative bodies exceed their jurisdiction even when procedural irregularities are conceded. It demonstrates the principle that administrative decisions must strictly comply with the procedural requirements set out in enabling legislation, and that mixing incompatible statutory procedures renders a decision reviewable.