NetOne Cellular (first appellant) and its then-Managing Director Reward Kangai (second appellant) were served with a subpoena duces tecum in proceedings between Econet Wireless (first respondent) and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (second respondent) before the Fiscal Appeal Court. The first respondent and second respondent were in dispute concerning classification and tariff rulings on imported base stations for calculating import duty. Econet alleged it was being discriminated against compared to NetOne, claiming NetOne's base stations were imported duty-free based on government ties. To prove this, Econet sought leave to subpoena Kangai to appear and produce documents relating to NetOne's importation of base stations from October 1998 to November 2013. NetOne objected on grounds that the subpoena was oppressive, violated privacy rights, was overly broad, constituted a fishing expedition, and was an abuse of process. The Fiscal Appeal Court dismissed the application to set aside the subpoena. During the appeal hearing, it emerged that Kangai had been dismissed from his employment with NetOne.
The appeal succeeded. The judgment of the Fiscal Appeal Court was set aside. The subpoena duces tecum issued on 9 February 2015 was set aside. The first respondent (Econet) was ordered to bear the costs in the court below and the costs of the appeal on the scale of legal practitioner and own client.
A subpoena duces tecum can only compel the production of documents and cannot simultaneously require a witness to give oral testimony - these are distinct forms of subpoena. A subpoena must be specific and designate documents with sufficient particularity to suggest their existence and materiality; broad, sweeping requests spanning periods irrelevant to the actual dispute constitute a fishing expedition and an abuse of court process. While the right to privacy under section 57 of the Constitution can be limited under section 86(2) where prescribed by law and reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, such limitation must not be arbitrary and must be proportionate to the legitimate purpose sought. An invasion of privacy through discovery must be rationally connected to securing justice and must not place a harsh or oppressive burden on the party whose privacy is invaded beyond what is strictly required.
The court noted that discovery in litigation is meant for securing evidence in pursuit of truth in a particular dispute, and courts should be wary of permitting litigants to use subpoenas to request large amounts of information hoping some may prove useful. The court observed that while a litigant is entitled to seek production of documentation vital to prosecuting its case, the request must relate to the dispute being litigated. The court referenced the principle from Bernstein v Bester that no right is absolute and privacy rights shrink as persons engage in communal relations and business activities, but emphasized this does not permit indiscriminate invasion of privacy. The court also observed that the second appellant's termination from employment meant he could no longer access documents belonging to the first appellant, making compliance with the subpoena impossible. The court indicated costs on a higher scale were appropriate to mark the court's displeasure with abuse of its processes.
This case establishes important principles in Zimbabwean law (applicable by analogy in South African law) regarding: (1) The fundamental distinction between a subpoena duces tecum (for document production only) and a subpoena ad testificandum (for oral testimony), confirming they cannot be combined in a single subpoena. (2) The limits on discovery processes - subpoenas must be specific and targeted, not broad fishing expeditions. (3) The balancing of constitutional rights, particularly the right to privacy under section 57 against access to information, with guidance on when privacy must prevail. (4) Standards for preventing abuse of court process through overly broad or oppressive discovery requests. (5) The practical application of constitutional limitations analysis under section 86(2). The case is significant for establishing procedural safeguards against oppressive discovery, particularly protecting commercial confidentiality and privacy rights while ensuring fair access to justice.