Judgment was granted against the applicant by the Harare Magistrate's Court on 13 March 2012. The applicant had contracted the respondent to drill a borehole at her house and was given quotations for the drilling. The borehole was drilled but no water was found. The applicant refused to pay for the drilling, arguing that full payment would only be made upon water being found. The respondent produced invoices and quotations at trial, and the applicant admitted she had not paid for the drilling. The magistrate found in favor of the respondent. The applicant filed an application for condonation for late noting of an appeal on 20 June 2012, approximately three months after the judgment.
The application for condonation for late noting of an appeal was dismissed with costs.
For condonation for late noting of an appeal to be granted, an applicant must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in noting the appeal; and (2) demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on the merits of the appeal. Failure to satisfy either requirement will result in dismissal of the condonation application. Furthermore, an appeal court will not interfere with factual findings of a trial court unless such findings are grossly unreasonable.
The court observed that while ignorance of the law is generally no defense, such ignorance may in certain circumstances be 'clothed' and constitute a defense where accompanied by other reasonable factors such as illness and medical travel. The court also noted that the magistrate's finding that there was no agreement that payment was conditional upon finding water was a factual determination that could not be termed wholly unreasonable, particularly where the applicant's version was disbelieved at trial.
This case illustrates the two-fold test for condonation applications in Zimbabwe: the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation for the delay AND demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on appeal. It demonstrates that even where a reasonable explanation for delay exists, the absence of prospects of success will result in refusal of condonation. The case also reinforces the principle that appeal courts are reluctant to interfere with factual findings of trial courts unless such findings are grossly unreasonable.