Mount Grace Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Jumua Metals & Minerals (Pvt) Ltd and Minister of Mines and Mining Development

Mount Grace Farm (applicant) obtained a judgment on 8 January 2020 (HH 844/19) ordering Jumua Metals & Minerals (first respondent) to cease all mining operations on its farm. The first respondent noted an appeal to the Supreme Court (SC 04/2020). According to the applicant, after the judgment was handed down, the first respondent escalated and intensified its mining operations, increasing its boundaries and taking up more of the applicant's pastures and farmlands. The applicant complained of severe land degradation, tremors from blasting explosives affecting the principal homestead, damage to grazing pastures, and threats to its goat project. The applicant brought an urgent chamber application seeking to execute the judgment pending appeal, requesting an order that the judgment should not be suspended by reason of the appeal and interim relief requiring the first respondent to cease all mining operations immediately.

• Whether the application met the requirements for urgent treatment under Rule 244 of the High Court Rules, 1971
• Whether the applicant established good cause to jump the queue and receive preferential treatment over other pending matters
• Whether the applicant demonstrated imminent danger to existing rights and the possibility of irreparable harm
• Whether an application for leave to execute pending appeal should ordinarily be brought as an urgent application

The application was struck off the roll with costs.

An applicant seeking to have a matter treated as urgent must establish good cause to justify jumping the queue and receiving preferential treatment over other litigants. To pass the urgency test, the applicant must show imminent danger to existing rights and the possibility of irreparable harm. Where an application for leave to execute pending appeal is based on the same complaints and circumstances that existed when the original proceedings were instituted, without new factual developments, the matter does not qualify for urgent treatment. The onus lies on the applicant to establish urgency, and bare assertions without supporting evidence are insufficient. Applications for leave to execute pending appeal should ordinarily be prosecuted by way of ordinary court application, with urgent treatment being the exception rather than the norm.

The court observed that naturally every litigant appearing before the courts wishes their matter to be heard on an urgent basis, because the longer it takes to obtain relief, the more it seems that justice is being delayed or denied. The court noted that while it would endeavour to hear matters as soon as reasonably possible, this is not always possible, hence the need for the court to exercise discretion to distinguish between matters that are urgent and those that may wait. The court commented that the difference between the original application and the current urgent application appeared to be merely in the terminology used, not in the substance of the complaints.

This case reinforces the strict approach Zimbabwean courts take to urgent applications, emphasizing that the urgency remedy is exceptional and should not be used routinely for matters that can wait on the ordinary roll. It clarifies that applications for leave to execute pending appeal should generally not be brought as urgent applications unless exceptional circumstances exist. The judgment demonstrates that repetition of complaints already dealt with in previous proceedings, without new factual developments, will not satisfy the urgency test. It reaffirms the principle that the onus is on the applicant to establish urgency and that mere assertions without supporting evidence will be insufficient.