The applicant claimed to have purchased shares in Bulawayo Funeral Services (Pvt) Ltd and Stand 1030, Bulawayo for Z$600,000,000 from Discount Company of Zimbabwe through the late Charles Hamer-Nel. The applicant received original documents but never took occupation of the property. The 2nd respondent continued operating from the premises. In 2003, the 1st respondent entered an agreement with the late Hamer-Nel and purchased the same property and took ownership of Bulawayo Funeral Services (Pvt) Ltd. On 2 November 2006, under case number HC 790/06, the 1st respondent obtained a default judgment against Charles Hamer-Nel and the Registrar of Deeds directing transfer of shares and the property. The applicant only became aware of this default judgment in October 2014 and sought rescission of the judgment in terms of Rule 449 of the High Court Rules, 1971, approximately 10 years after the judgment was granted. The applicant never took occupation of the property, paid utility bills, or spent money on its development, while the 1st respondent had developed the property considerably.
The application for rescission of judgment was dismissed with costs against the applicant.
Rule 449 of the High Court Rules is a procedural mechanism designed to correct irregularities and cannot be used to obtain substantive relief against third parties. For rescission under Rule 449, an applicant must establish: (a) the judgment was erroneously sought or granted; (b) it was granted in the applicant's absence; and (c) the applicant's rights or interests were affected by the judgment. Applications for rescission must be made expeditiously and timeously, as there must be finality in litigation. In cases of double sales where transfer has not been passed to either party, the first purchaser in time is stronger in law, unless special circumstances affecting the balance of equities favor the second purchaser. The balance of equities considers factors including whether transfer was effected, expenditure on the property, development undertaken, and occupation. A party cannot claim rights were affected by a judgment when they only acquired a retrospective, self-created interest after the judgment was granted.
The court observed that it was peculiar and incredulous that the applicant would purchase property for a substantial sum but for 10 years not bother to locate the property, take occupation, pay utility bills, or derive any benefit from it. The court noted this raised suspicion that the applicant was aware the 1st respondent had purchased the same property and chose to wait and do nothing. The court remarked that sophisticated persons with access to legal representation could not credibly claim they secured title by mere possession of original title deeds. While the 1st respondent raised the "dirty hands" principle based on pending criminal fraud charges against the applicant for using title deeds as security without authority, counsel did not pursue this point as it became clear the principle was not applicable since the criminal case had not been finalized. The court noted that in the circumstances, any recourse by the applicant should be sought against the fourth respondent (the executrix of the late Hamer-Nel's estate) rather than attempting to elevate its rights over those of the first, second and third respondents.
This case reinforces important principles in Zimbabwean law regarding: (1) the strict requirements for rescission of judgment under Rule 449, particularly that it is designed to correct procedural irregularities rather than grant substantive relief; (2) the principle of double sales where the first purchaser in time prevails unless the balance of equities favors the second purchaser; (3) the importance of timeousness in applications for rescission of judgment and the principle of finality in litigation; (4) the assessment of balance of equities in property disputes, considering factors such as transfer, occupation, development, and expenditure on the property; and (5) that parties cannot use Rule 449 to obtain substantive relief against third parties who were not party to the original judgment. The case demonstrates judicial unwillingness to disturb judgments long after they have been granted where the applicant has slept on their rights.