The appellant was employed by Zimbabwe United Passenger Company Ltd (ZUPCO). Upon employment, he signed a letter barring him from conducting any business in direct competition with his employer. During his employment, it was alleged that the appellant purchased and operated two minibuses. He was charged with misconduct and dismissed from employment. The appellant referred the matter to a labour relations officer, who determined the matter in his favour and ordered his reinstatement. This decision was upheld by a senior labour relations officer. The respondent (ZUPCO) appealed to the Labour Court, which set aside the decisions of both labour relations officers. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. The disciplinary proceedings commenced with a letter dated 13 October 1997, and the appellant raised complaints about unfair labour practices at meetings in November 1997. Several postponements occurred at the appellant's request. The matter was only entertained by the labour relations officer on 6 August 1999, approximately 18 months after the initial complaint.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Section 101(6) of the Labour Relations Act is permissive and allows referral to a labour relations officer only before a determination has been made by a disciplinary committee under a code of conduct. The thirty-day period specified in section 101(6) is the minimum period after which a concerned party may refer a matter to a labour relations officer if it has not been determined; it does not render determinations made after thirty days invalid. Labour relations officers have no jurisdiction to hear matters that have already been determined under an employment code of conduct. Once a determination is made under a code of conduct, the proper recourse is to appeal through the internal procedures provided in the code. Section 94(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act requires disputes arising after 1 January 1993 to be referred to a labour relations officer within 180 days from the date the dispute first arose, failing which the dispute prescribes. A party who continues to participate in disciplinary proceedings after the expiry of thirty days is deemed to have chosen to wait for the determination rather than refer the matter to a labour relations officer.
The Court observed that the thirty-day period in section 101(6) was likely intended to prevent parties from frustrating each other by causing delays to the prejudice of the other party. The Court also noted that technical complaints about the composition of disciplinary committees cannot nullify proceedings where the record reflects that the employee received a fair hearing with legal representation. The Court suggested that it would be inappropriate for a chairperson to refuse an appellant's request for a postponement merely because the thirty-day period had expired.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law as it clarifies the interpretation and application of section 101(6) of the Labour Relations Act regarding the jurisdiction of labour relations officers to intervene in disputes subject to employment codes of conduct. It establishes that the thirty-day period is permissive rather than mandatory, and that labour relations officers lack jurisdiction to hear matters that have already been determined by disciplinary committees established under codes of conduct. The case also reinforces the application of prescription periods under section 94(1)(b) of the Act, requiring disputes to be referred within 180 days. It demonstrates the importance of following proper internal appeal procedures and clarifies the limited circumstances under which labour relations officers can intervene in matters governed by employment codes of conduct.