McGregor v City of Johannesburg

The first appellant was the registered owner of residential property on which an advertising sign belonging to the second appellant was erected. In terms of a letter dated 1 July 1999, the respondent's predecessor (Eastern Metropolitan Local Council) approved an application to erect the sign for a fixed period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2002 under the 1995 by-laws. The 1995 by-laws were repealed by the 1999 by-laws, which were in turn repealed by the 2001 by-laws effective 1 December 2001. Both the 1999 and 2001 by-laws contained provisions deeming anything done under repealed by-laws to have been done under the new by-laws. The 2001 by-laws declared advertising signage on residential property unlawful (clause 5(26)). The property was zoned residential. The respondent sought an interdict to prevent the appellants from displaying the sign after the original approval period expired on 30 June 2002. Cachalia J granted the interdict, and the full court dismissed the appeal (Satchwell and Tsoka JJ, with Goldstein J dissenting). The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal with special leave.

• Whether clause 4(3) of the 2001 by-laws, which exempted lawfully displayed signs from the requirements of the new by-laws, extended the scope of the original approval beyond its fixed period
• The proper interpretation of exemption provisions in municipal by-laws in the context of repealed legislation
• Whether the exemption in clause 4(3) converted a time-limited approval into perpetual approval

The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.

The binding legal principle established is that exemption provisions in new municipal by-laws which preserve the validity of approvals granted under repealed by-laws serve only to preserve existing rights to the extent previously granted, but do not extend the scope, duration or limitations of those rights. An exemption clause that exempts lawfully displayed signs from the requirements of new by-laws preserves the validity of the original approval but does not delete any time limitations or other conditions to which that approval was subject. A time-limited approval granted under repealed by-laws does not become a perpetual approval merely because an exemption provision in new by-laws exempts lawfully displayed signs from the requirements of the new legislation. Municipal by-laws must be interpreted purposively, having regard to their overall regulatory purpose, and an interpretation that would lead to absurd results or permanently exempt from regulation matters specifically proscribed by the new by-laws should be rejected.

The Court made observations about the relationship between clause 4(3) and clause 43(2), noting that both clauses have the effect of preserving existing rights but serve different purposes and neither is rendered superfluous by the other. Clause 43(2) preserves the validity of legal acts performed in terms of previous by-laws provided such acts are permitted in terms of the new by-laws, while clause 4(3) preserves what was lawfully done in terms of repealed legislation and which has, in terms of the new legislation, become unlawful. The Court also commented that to accept the appellants' interpretation would mean that signs which do not comply with the provisions of the new by-laws may, by reason of such non-compliance, be favoured with extended rights - a result that could never have been intended by the legislature.

This case is significant in South African local government law as it establishes important principles for interpreting municipal by-laws, particularly provisions dealing with the transition from repealed to new by-laws. It clarifies that exemption provisions in new by-laws which preserve existing rights granted under repealed by-laws do not extend the scope or duration of those rights beyond what was originally granted. The judgment emphasizes the importance of purposive interpretation and avoiding absurd results when construing municipal legislation. It provides guidance to municipalities and property owners on the effect of transitional provisions in by-laws and confirms that time-limited approvals cannot be converted into perpetual rights merely by the operation of exemption clauses in new legislation.