The applicant was employed by Manica Zimbabwe Limited as a salaries/human resources officer. He was suspended on 29 March 2012 and dismissed on 12 May 2012. Aggrieved by his suspension and dismissal, he intended to file an application against Manica Zimbabwe Limited and its managing director and human resources manager seeking a declaration that the suspension and disciplinary proceedings were null and void, and seeking reinstatement without loss of salary and benefits. He sought to cite the first respondent (Manica Africa P/L, a South African company and parent company of Manica Zimbabwe Limited) and second respondent (Rob G. Carson, managing director of Manica Africa P/L, based in South Africa) as fourth and fifth respondents. Both respondents were peregrini (foreigners not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe). The applicant applied for leave to sue and for substituted service of court process on these two South African-based respondents.
The application was dismissed. The court refused to grant the applicant leave to sue the first and second respondents and refused to grant an order for substituted service.
1. Under section 15 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], to found or confirm jurisdiction over a peregrinus, the applicant must satisfy the court that the peregrinus has property within Zimbabwe capable of attachment or is present in Zimbabwe for arrest. 2. A subsidiary company is a separate legal person distinct from its parent/holding company, applying the principle from Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd. 3. The assets of a subsidiary company do not constitute property of the parent company for purposes of founding jurisdiction, even where the parent is the sole shareholder. The parent company only has a financial interest in the subsidiary, which cannot be elevated to ownership of the subsidiary's assets. 4. There is no concept of "indirect" cause of action in law - an applicant either has a cause of action or does not. The wrongful acts of a subsidiary company cannot be attributed to the parent company or its directors for purposes of establishing a cause of action. 5. It serves no purpose to grant leave to sue where the applicant has no cause of action against the respondent and the court lacks jurisdiction.
The court observed that in the proposed draft order, there was no relief actually sought against the first respondent, which further undermined the applicant's case for leave to sue. This suggests that even if jurisdiction and cause of action had been established, the application may have failed on the basis that no substantive relief was claimed against the respondent.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law for clarifying the requirements for founding jurisdiction over peregrine defendants under section 15 of the High Court Act. It reinforces the principle of separate legal personality between parent and subsidiary companies, holding that a subsidiary's assets cannot be considered property of the parent company for jurisdictional purposes. The case also emphasizes that courts will not entertain applications where there is no proper cause of action and no jurisdiction, even where the applicant attempts to characterize a non-existent cause of action as "indirect". The judgment serves as an important reminder that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish both jurisdiction and a cause of action before being granted leave to sue foreign defendants.