The appellant was charged jointly with Patrick Badza at the Regional Court (sitting as a Designated Anti-Corruption Court) with extortion under s 134(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification & Reform) Act, with an alternative charge of bribery under s 170. Both accused were employed in the President's Department. The complainant, Kyle Dongchuan Wang, was managing director of Live Touch (Pvt) Ltd, a cement manufacturer that had applied for 33 Temporary Employment Permits (TEPs) for Chinese experts. Badza allegedly contacted Wang demanding US$300 per application (US$9,900 total). On 18 May 2021, they met at Holiday Inn and later at Garfunkels restaurant in Sam Levy Village, where Wang handed Badza US$3,500 as a deposit. Six ZACC officials observed the transaction. Upon Badza's arrest, the appellant allegedly ran away and was apprehended after a 100-metre chase by ZACC officials with assistance from members of the public. The trap money was recovered. Both accused were denied bail by the Magistrates Court. The appellant appealed the bail refusal.
The appeal against bail refusal was dismissed.
An appellate court will only interfere with a bail decision where there is irregularity or gross misdirection by the lower court, not merely because it might have decided differently. The presumption of innocence in bail applications does not override other factors where there is cognizable indication the accused will not abide by bail conditions. Flight from the scene of arrest can constitute relevant evidence of likelihood to abscond. A bail court properly exercises discretion when it considers all factors under s 117(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act and reasonably concludes that certain factors (such as gravity of offence and strength of prosecution case) establish grounds for bail refusal. The seriousness of corruption-related offences carrying substantial imprisonment terms, combined with strong prosecution evidence and flight behavior, can justify a finding of likelihood to abscond.
The court noted that while running away is not an element of the offence charged, it is relevant conduct that can be considered in assessing likelihood to abscond. The court observed that corruption offenses carry varying sentences (from fines to lengthy imprisonment) because the legislature recognized they are committed in varying circumstances, but this does not diminish their inherent seriousness. The court commented that an appellant cannot succeed by advancing a different version of events on appeal than what was presented to the court below, particularly regarding material facts like whether the appellant fled the scene.
This case reinforces the narrow scope of appellate interference in bail decisions under Zimbabwean law, confirming that appellate courts will only intervene where there is demonstrable misdirection or gross irrationality. It clarifies that the presumption of innocence, while important in bail applications, does not automatically entitle an accused to pre-trial liberty where there is cognizable indication of likelihood to abscond. The judgment demonstrates proper application of the multi-factor test under s 117(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, particularly the balancing of seriousness of offence, strength of prosecution case, and accused's conduct. It also illustrates that an accused's flight from arrest can be properly considered as evidence of likelihood to abscond, and that changing explanations on appeal regarding material facts will not succeed.