Ndou J made several significant obiter observations: (1) He expressed support for the jurisprudential validity of the principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial as established in South African cases (S v Alexander, S v Tyebela, S v Kanyile, S v Mushimba, S v Davids), notwithstanding that some were later overturned on appeal; (2) He respectfully disagreed with the South African Appellate Division's decision in S v Rudman that a criminal trial is not required to be fair but merely to adhere to formalities and rules of procedure; (3) He expressed the view that fairness to the accused should be an overriding requirement to which all rules of evidence in criminal trials must conform, and that Zimbabwe does not necessarily need a constitutional provision similar to section 35(3) of the South African Constitution to achieve this - rather, what is needed is "the changing of concepts of justice by insisting that criminal court proceedings involving unrepresented accused persons should be fair in substance as well as in form"; (4) He cited with approval American jurisprudence on fairness (Powell v Alabama and Argersinger v Hamlin) as examples of how fairness and justice to the accused can be achieved through judicial development of the law; (5) He noted that the Zimbabwean criminal system is essentially adversarial in nature, requiring the presiding officer to be an impartial arbiter, but when the accused is unrepresented, the judicial officer must also serve as an adviser while maintaining impartiality.