Marvel Mtisi v Josiah Murombo Mimana and Others

The applicant and first respondent were previously in an unregistered customary marriage which ended in 2025. They were co-directors and 50:50 shareholders in MIMJ Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd (second respondent) and MIMJ Mining Corp (Pvt) Ltd (seventh respondent). Following the breakdown of the marriage, the applicant instituted proceedings under case number HCHF 1566/25 for division of matrimonial property. On 20 June 2025, she obtained a court order under HCH 2717/25 directing joint administration of the companies. However, on 30 June 2025, the first respondent obtained a default judgment under HCH 2552/25 removing the applicant from directorship after she allegedly did not enter appearance to defend. The first respondent also appropriated her shareholding, appointed new directors (third and fourth respondents), and amended company documents to reflect himself as sole 100% shareholder. The applicant only became aware of the default judgment and the altered company documents on 4 August 2025 through a Nedbank official. She then filed an application for rescission of the default judgment (HCH 3969/25) and the present urgent application seeking an interdict to restrain the first respondent from holding himself out as sole shareholder and to suspend the operation of the order under HCH 2552/25.

• Whether the applicant used the wrong form for the urgent chamber application
• Whether the omission to specify dies induciae in an urgent chamber application is fatal
• Whether Form 23 is suitable for urgent chamber applications
• Whether the matter satisfied the requirements for urgency
• Whether the relief sought had been overtaken by events
• Whether an interdict can be granted to prevent acts that have already occurred
• Whether an applicant may amend a draft order during hearing

The matter was struck off the roll for lack of urgency. The applicant was ordered to pay the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 7th respondents' costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) In urgent chamber applications under Rule 60(6), applicants cannot and need not prescribe dies induciae for filing of opposition, as hearing dates are set at the judge's discretion upon immediate consideration of the papers. (2) The absence of dies induciae in urgent chamber applications does not render the application defective or fatally defective. (3) "Appropriate modifications" to Form 23 in the context of urgent applications refer to procedural timelines, and their omission does not invalidate the application. (4) A matter lacks urgency where the relief sought has been overtaken by events - that is, where the acts the applicant seeks to prevent have already occurred and the factual foundation has materially shifted, rendering any judgment ineffectual. (5) An interdict cannot be granted to restrain conduct that has already been completed; interdicts are preventative remedies for imminent harm, not remedies for historical acts. (6) Courts may allow amendments to draft orders during hearings provided the amendment remains within the four corners of the pleaded case, does not introduce a new cause of action, and does not prejudice the opposing party.

MUREMBA J made several important non-binding observations: (1) Form 23 is procedurally ill-suited to urgent chamber applications as its structure presupposes fixed dies induciae and predictable hearing schedules fundamentally incompatible with urgent proceedings. The final clause of Form 23 stating that the matter will be set down "without further notice" if no opposing affidavit is filed contradicts Rule 60(6) which places scheduling in the judge's hands. The court recommended that the Rules Committee develop a dedicated form tailored to urgent chamber applications that reflects judicial discretion, compressed timelines, and avoids misleading language. (2) The court expressed concern about counsel's failure to disclose material portions of binding authority (Yasmin Mahommed v Kashiri) that contradicted the point in limine being raised, stating this was a failure of candour to the court and occasioned unnecessary expenditure of time and resources. (3) The court clarified that allowing amendments to draft orders does not constitute judicial assistance to a party, as the court remains neutral and may still refuse relief if the case is not made out. (4) The court emphasized that courts are neutral arbiters whose role is to determine only the disputes parties bring before them, based on the pleaded facts, and should not stray into deciding matters never pleaded or argued.

This case is significant for clarifying several important procedural principles in Zimbabwean law: (1) It distinguishes between ordinary chamber applications (governed by Rule 60(7)) and urgent chamber applications (governed by Rule 60(6)), holding that dies induciae requirements applicable to ordinary applications cannot be imposed on urgent applications where hearing dates are set at judicial discretion. (2) It establishes that the failure to specify dies induciae in urgent chamber applications is not fatal, as applicants cannot predict when matters will be heard. (3) It identifies the unsuitability of Form 23 for urgent chamber applications and recommends the creation of a dedicated form. (4) It reaffirms the principle that urgency must relate to the specific cause of action and that relief sought must not have been overtaken by events. (5) It clarifies that courts may allow amendments to draft orders during hearings provided the amendment remains within the pleaded case and does not prejudice the other side. (6) It emphasizes that interdicts are designed to prevent imminent harm, not to reverse acts that have already occurred. The judgment provides important guidance on the nature and requirements of urgent chamber applications in Zimbabwe.