The applicant was the suspended Chief Executive of the Grain Marketing Board (1st respondent). He was initially suspended on 1 March 2000 by the permanent secretary under the Public Service Regulations, which was later found to be invalid and he was reinstated with full salary. On 8 March 2000, he was re-suspended under the GMB Code of Conduct by the GMB Management Committee Chairman, which was also successfully challenged. On 24 October 2000, the GMB Board Chairman re-suspended the applicant, stating disciplinary proceedings would be instituted either under the Code of Conduct or Statutory Instrument 371 of 1985. The 1st respondent applied to the Labour Relations Officer on 14 November 2000 for permission to terminate the applicant's employment. The applicant challenged the legal representation of the respondents on conflict of interest grounds, and the firm subsequently renounced agency on 10 November 2004. The applicant sought a provisional order barring termination of his benefits and salaries pending disciplinary measures or criminal prosecution.
The application was dismissed with costs.
Where a labour dispute is pending before the Labour Court, the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the same matter, as the Labour Court is the specialized tribunal created specifically to deal with labour disputes and is clothed with the necessary expertise, resources, and both appellate and review jurisdiction. Section 124 of the Labour Relations Act mandates that where proceedings have been instituted in respect of any matter, no person shall institute or continue other proceedings in respect of the same or related matter without first advising the second court or tribunal of the earlier proceedings. Failure to comply with section 124 renders the reference to the High Court incompetent. Litigants must exhaust available domestic remedies, particularly specialized tribunal remedies, before approaching the High Court.
The court observed that it has discretion to lift a bar where there is a reasonable explanation for procedural default, such as confusion arising from conflict of interests with legal practitioners who subsequently renounced agency. However, where a party deliberately decides not to oppose an application and to abide by the court's decision, that party cannot subsequently be allowed to "blow both hot and cold" by attempting to participate in the proceedings years later. The court also noted that the ends of justice are best served by determining applications on their merits where reasonable explanations exist for procedural delays.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law jurisprudence for establishing the primacy of the Labour Court in labour dispute matters and reinforcing the requirement under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act that litigants must notify courts of parallel proceedings to prevent duplicitous litigation. It emphasizes the doctrine of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the specialized jurisdiction of the Labour Court over employment disputes. The case also illustrates procedural principles regarding lifting of bars and the court's discretion in managing procedural defaults where reasonable explanations exist.