Martin Tendai Shone v The State

The applicant was charged with Armed Robbery as defined in section 126 of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act Chapter 9:23. On 28 June 2013, at around 13:40 hrs, the applicant together with 7 others allegedly raided house number 86 Circular Drive Burnside. They allegedly threatened domestic workers with pistols, before ransacking the house and stealing a cabinet safe containing $400 and some jewellery. Parts of the stolen safe were recovered from the applicant's business premises. The applicant was implicated by his co-accused. The applicant applied for bail pending trial, citing ill health as one of the grounds for suitability to bail.

• Whether the applicant should be granted bail pending trial
• Whether there was a real likelihood that the applicant would abscond if granted bail
• Whether the applicant was a suitable candidate for bail considering the seriousness of the charges and the strength of the state's case
• What factors should be considered when assessing bail applications in serious criminal cases

The application for bail pending trial was dismissed.

In bail applications involving serious offences such as armed robbery: (1) The presumption of innocence must be balanced against the interests of justice, including the likelihood of absconding; (2) When assessing risk of absconding, courts must consider the nature and gravity of the offence, the strength of the prosecution case, the probable penalties if convicted, and the accused's ability to flee; (3) Where incriminating evidence directly links an accused to a serious offence (such as recovery of stolen items from the accused's premises and implication by co-accused), and the accused offers no defence to these matters at the bail stage, this weighs heavily against granting bail; (4) Ill health alone cannot be the sole basis for granting bail where there is a real likelihood of absconding given the seriousness of charges and penalties involved.

The court observed that bail proceedings are different from criminal trials in that the court has a wide range of information available, including hearsay evidence, as the basis upon which to determine whether or not to grant bail. The court also noted that the main object of granting bail is to accord a suspect his constitutional right to freedom pending trial, while guarding against the danger of allowing freedom where there is a possibility that the ends of justice will be defeated.

This judgment illustrates the application of bail jurisprudence in Zimbabwe in cases involving serious offences such as armed robbery. It demonstrates how courts balance the constitutional right to freedom pending trial against the risk of absconding and defeating the ends of justice. The case reinforces that ill health alone is insufficient grounds for bail where there is strong evidence linking an accused to a serious crime. It also demonstrates the court's application of section 117 of the Criminal Procedure & Evidence Act Chapter 9:07 and relevant precedents in determining bail suitability.