The applicant married the deceased under customary law in 1986. Unknown to her, the deceased was already customarily married to the third respondent. In 1998, the applicant and deceased entered into a civil marriage. The applicant contributed financially to the acquisition and construction of a house on stand 7357 Budiriro 4, Harare, which was registered in the deceased's name. The deceased also constructed a house in Seke rural area for the third respondent. When the deceased died on 5 April 2012, the applicant registered the estate (DR 630/12) with the first respondent as executor. The applicant and third respondent initially agreed each would retain the house they lived in. However, the final liquidation and distribution account allocated the Budiriro house to both women in equal shares and omitted the Seke property. The applicant was not notified that the account was lying for inspection. She objected in May 2025, but the Master confirmed the account on 25 May 2025, guided by s68(3)(4) of the Administration of Estates Act. The applicant then sought to set aside this direction.
The application was dismissed. There was no order as to costs because no opposition had been filed.
A direction given by the Master of the High Court in terms of s52(9) of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01] cannot be set aside by way of ordinary court application where the grounds are merely disagreement with the Master's interpretation of the law. The proper remedy for challenging such decisions is by way of review proceedings. An ordinary court application to set aside the Master's direction can only succeed where special circumstances exist, such as fraud or misrepresentation, which must be specifically pleaded with supporting facts. Mere disagreement with the legal interpretation applied by the Master does not constitute grounds for setting aside a direction through an ordinary application.
The court referenced case law on reopening of estates, noting that such applications can only succeed if there are special circumstances justifying reopening, with fraud or misrepresentation being examples of such circumstances. The court cited Vandira v Estate Late George William Noble & 2 others HMA 10-23, Zvavandiita v Ndlovu & Ors HB 82-16, Muzungu & Ors v Muzungu & Ors HH 172-15, and Chirisa v Mugadzvawaneta & Others HH 323-14 as examples where estates were reopened due to fraud, exclusion of beneficiaries, or illegality. The court also cited Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Duran HH 54-07 regarding the need for specific pleading of fraud. While these observations provided context, they were not directly determinative as the court found no fraud was alleged in this case.
This case clarifies the proper procedure for challenging decisions made by the Master of the High Court under s52(9) of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01]. It establishes that such decisions cannot be challenged through ordinary court applications merely because a party disagrees with the Master's interpretation of the law. The case reinforces that review proceedings are the appropriate mechanism for challenging the Master's directions in estate administration. The judgment also touches on the interpretation of s68F(2)(c) regarding distribution of property in estates where the deceased was survived by two wives in a polygamous setup, though this issue was not substantively determined.