Margolis Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Harare Municipality

The applicant owned Stand 571 Derbyshire Township Harare, an industrial stand. The applicant obtained a subdivision permit and subdivided the property. The general plan was approved by the Survey General on 29 October 2010, and a consolidated deed of transfer was registered on 16 April 2012. Prior to August 2013, the respondent levied rates of approximately US$400 on the entire property. In July 2013, the respondent issued a Rates Clearance Certificate showing no rates were due. However, in August 2013, the respondent sent a backdated bill for $302,866.17 (later reduced to $114,590.72) for rates on the individual subdivided stands, backdated to October 2010 when the general plan was approved. The applicant disputed the rates, arguing they were not yet due as no buildings were erected or occupied on the subdivided stands. The respondent instituted action claims for the rates, and the applicant sought interim relief compelling the respondent to issue Rates Clearance Certificates pending determination of the dispute.

• Whether the court could compel the respondent to issue a Rates Clearance Certificate pending determination of a dispute regarding rates payable
• Whether the court has power to suspend or modify provisions of a statute
• Whether rates levied by the municipality on subdivided industrial stands were due and payable before development, occupation or completion of buildings
• The interpretation of sections 276, 279, and 282(2)(a) of the Urban Council Act [Chapter 25:15]

The application was dismissed with costs.

Courts cannot suspend or modify the provisions of a statute, regardless of how desirable or necessary it may appear. Section 282(2)(a) of the Urban Council Act [Chapter 25:15] is couched in peremptory terms and stipulates mandatory formalities that must be complied with before a Rates Clearance Certificate can be issued. Only the legislature, and possibly a properly delegated authority, can amend an Act of Parliament. While courts can declare an Act unconstitutional or ultra vires, they cannot amend statutory provisions simply because necessity demands it. A party aggrieved by an administrative decision should follow proper administrative law procedures rather than seek judicial modification of statutory requirements.

The court noted that while the respondent took issue with the applicant seeking relief on behalf of various purchasers who were not cited, this would not be fatal to the applicant's case as the applicant, being the owner, is liable to pay rates under section 279 of the Act. The draft order could have been amended to reflect the correct position. The court also observed that many of the submissions made by the applicant's counsel regarding prospects of success in the main matter should be reserved for the court dealing with the substantive dispute between the parties regarding the validity and timing of the rates levied.

This case reinforces the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers in Zimbabwe, particularly the limitation on judicial power to amend or suspend statutory provisions. It clarifies that courts cannot modify legislation even when circumstances appear to warrant it, and that only the legislature (or properly delegated authority) can amend Acts of Parliament. The case is significant for its application of the principle from Registrar General v Combined Harare Residents Association regarding judicial restraint in relation to statutory interpretation. It also provides guidance on the mandatory nature of section 282(2)(a) of the Urban Council Act regarding Rates Clearance Certificates, and highlights the importance of following proper administrative law remedies when challenging decisions of administrative authorities.